Armageddon: Book III of the First Strike Series
During the Truman administration, Dr. Young, in his position at the CIA, managed an operation called Anaconda that was designed to make the Soviets believe that the B-36 was an accomplished intercontinental bomber capable of carrying nuclear weapons deep inside the Soviet Union to counterforce targets.
Dr. Young was also an accomplished civil aeronautics engineer who took an active part in the development of the F-86 and then the U-2 planes. During the Eisenhower administration’s eight years in the White House, Dr. Young assisted Richard Bissell in developing and implementing the U-2’s twenty-four missions over the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Recognizing the massive 17–1 advantage the United States enjoyed in deliverable nuclear weapons, Dr. Young—in an effort to stop a first strike by US military hardliners—found it necessary to mislead the National Security Establishment into believing the Soviets had a formidable deterrent. Along with Dr. Carl Kaysen of Harvard University, Dr. Young presented President Kennedy with an alternative to the Single Integrated Option Plan (SIOP) developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1960–1961. It was this deception, his knowledge of covert paramilitary actions, and his criticism of the Warren Commission that landed him squarely in the sights of William Forde of the Justice Department.
When Kennedy took office on January 20, 1961, he faced many problems. Eisenhower had already sunk millions of dollars into the Bay of Pigs project and had balanced the budget on the back of the military, leaving the United States and NATO without a sufficient conventional response to the pressures Kennedy would face in Berlin. Kennedy exacerbated those problems by insisting on going to meet Khrushchev in Vienna on June 4, 1961, for a summit concerning the Berlin situation. At the summit, Khrushchev threatened to cut off the allies’ access to West Berlin by concluding a separate peace treaty with East Germany. In response and in an address to the nation on July 25, 1961, Kennedy announced a massive conventional buildup. The Joint Chiefs of Staff maintained that the Soviets would interpret the conventional buildup as a denial of the will to employ our nuclear deterrent and advised Kennedy that the United States could clearly prevail if it struck with nuclear weapons first. The Berlin problem continued to fester until it seemingly would lead to World War III.
Dr. Young was also an accomplished civil aeronautics engineer who took an active part in the development of the F-86 and then the U-2 planes. During the Eisenhower administration’s eight years in the White House, Dr. Young assisted Richard Bissell in developing and implementing the U-2’s twenty-four missions over the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Recognizing the massive 17–1 advantage the United States enjoyed in deliverable nuclear weapons, Dr. Young—in an effort to stop a first strike by US military hardliners—found it necessary to mislead the National Security Establishment into believing the Soviets had a formidable deterrent. Along with Dr. Carl Kaysen of Harvard University, Dr. Young presented President Kennedy with an alternative to the Single Integrated Option Plan (SIOP) developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1960–1961. It was this deception, his knowledge of covert paramilitary actions, and his criticism of the Warren Commission that landed him squarely in the sights of William Forde of the Justice Department.
When Kennedy took office on January 20, 1961, he faced many problems. Eisenhower had already sunk millions of dollars into the Bay of Pigs project and had balanced the budget on the back of the military, leaving the United States and NATO without a sufficient conventional response to the pressures Kennedy would face in Berlin. Kennedy exacerbated those problems by insisting on going to meet Khrushchev in Vienna on June 4, 1961, for a summit concerning the Berlin situation. At the summit, Khrushchev threatened to cut off the allies’ access to West Berlin by concluding a separate peace treaty with East Germany. In response and in an address to the nation on July 25, 1961, Kennedy announced a massive conventional buildup. The Joint Chiefs of Staff maintained that the Soviets would interpret the conventional buildup as a denial of the will to employ our nuclear deterrent and advised Kennedy that the United States could clearly prevail if it struck with nuclear weapons first. The Berlin problem continued to fester until it seemingly would lead to World War III.