<![CDATA[THOMAS J. YEGGY - Blog]]>Wed, 24 Dec 2025 22:45:16 -0800Weebly<![CDATA[​A House of Dynamite: Thirteen Technical and Storyline Issues]]>Tue, 23 Dec 2025 03:01:32 GMThttps://www.thomasjyeggy.com/blog/a-house-of-dynamite-thirteen-technical-and-storyline-issues A Technical and Artistic Analysis of A House of Dynamite
 
Introduction
On October 24, 2025, Netflix released A House of Dynamite, an apocalyptic nuclear thriller directed by Kathryn Bigelow and written by Noah Oppenheim. The film divides into three forty-two-minute segments, each covering the same nineteen-minute period from different perspectives: military bases, the White House, and the President.
 
The Plot
The story opens July 16, 2025, with a section titled Inclination is Flattening. At 9:33 a.m. Eastern, the White House Situation Room erupts when sensors detect a missile launched near the North Korean Peninsula. A national security conference call produces only yawns. One participant observes, “Looks like it is near Japan, maybe middle of the Sea of Japan.” Four minutes later: “Third time since Christmas, so why a National Security call?”
 
The nonchalance continues. Eleven minutes in, the Ground Base Intercept Post at Fort Greely, Alaska reports, “STRATCOM says DSP satellites missed the launch.” According to Greely personnel, TPY-2 ground-based radar in Japan indicates a flight vector consistent with previous DPRK tests. At 12:35 in General Tony Brady, commanding officer at U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), announces: “Expect splashdown in Sea of Japan.”
 
Thirty-six seconds later, alarm bells sound. The missile's trajectory flattens, and it maintains a velocity of 6km/sec. Typical movements for an ICBM. 
 
After a few m ore seconds, four commanders join the National Security Command call: Tony Brady at USSTRATCOM, Offutt Air Base, Omaha; Admiral Jerry Brendell, USINDOPACCOM; the NORTHCOM Commander General Longman; and General Maynard, USFK (US Forces Korea). Brady makes the terrifying announcement – the missile will boost a warhead into a suborbital trajectory. Target: somewhere in the United States.( See 13:44 to 14:08) At 14:15 a declaration is made that “impact will be in nineteen minutes.” 
 
At Fort Greely, crews prepare two interceptors with exo-atmospheric kill vehicles (EKVs) designed to destroy incoming warheads through collision – “like trying to hit a bullet with a bullet,” as multiple characters lament. Greely launches two Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI). The first EKV misses. The second malfunctions when the EKV fails to separate from its booster. With no plan B, and commanders unwilling to deplete reserves early on, the single warhead will likely annihilate 9.2 million residents of greater Chicago.
 
The second segment, Hitting a Bullet with a Bullet, ping-pongs between the Situation Room, USSTRATCOM in Omaha, Fort Greely, Gettysburg (where the DPRK intelligence specialist vacations), the Pentagon, the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC), a B-2 alert base, and other sites. Throughout this segment, viewers hear the President's voice but never see him.
 
The final forty-two minutes (A House Filled With Dynamite) follow the President figuring out his course of action. He can retaliate at once or – according to military advisors – risk total annihilation. Top brass argues that failure to launch an immediate preemptive strike will neutralize U.S. retaliatory assets capabilities before they can be used.
 
With the warhead seconds from Chicago after a twenty-two-minute flight, no one knows who fired it. The question becomes: does the U.S. nuke everyone in retaliation?
 
Poetic License
Poetic license allows filmmakers to bend facts for dramatic effect – prioritizing emotional impact over documentary accuracy. Films like Amadeus and Braveheart alter history wholesale. Others like Schindler's List, All the President's Men, and Nuremberg stay faithful to facts while capturing authentic period atmosphere.
Where does A House of Dynamite fall on this spectrum?
 
The Argument
On October 16, 2025, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) issued a memo about A House of Dynamite:
While the film highlights that deterrence can fail, which reinforces the need for an active homeland missile defense system, this fictional depiction also downplays US capabilities. The fictional interceptors in the movie missed their target, and we understand this is intended to be a compelling part of the drama intended for the entertainment of the audience, but results from real world testing tell us a vastly different story.
 
The MDA claimed the 50-61 percent intercept rate cited in the film “is outdated, and today's interceptors have displayed a 100 percent accuracy in testing for more than a decade.”

The truth likely falls between the film's portrayal and MDA's claims. Regardless, Bigelow and Oppenheim launched a robust media campaign defending their accuracy.

On CBS's Sunday morning program, Bigelow confirmed she had not consulted the Pentagon: “I felt that we needed to be more independent, but that being said, we had multiple tech advisors who have worked in the Pentagon. They were with me every day we shot.”
 
In The Hollywood Reporter, Bigelow said, “I just state the truth. In this piece, it's all about realism and authenticity.”
 
Oppenheim doubled down in The Atlantic:

And we say in the movie, 61 percent. That's based on data from controlled tests. So, you can imagine, those are under the best of circumstances. A lot of the folks we talked to felt that 61 percent was being very generous when it comes to the system that we have. As we mentioned in the movie, there are fewer than fifty of these ground-based intercepts in our arsenal, so even if it were working perfectly, there are not a ton of them that we have available to use.
 
The Problem for Filmmakers
Claiming “authenticity” imposes higher standards than acknowledging poetic license or displaying opening disclaimers. When films present themselves as factual while significantly altering established facts, technical systems, and institutional procedures, audiences often accept the fictionalized narrative as literal truth. This creates widespread misconceptions about real-world capabilities and events.
 
Issue 1: Defense Support Program (DSP) Satellites are Obsolete
Between 1970 and 2007, twenty-three Defense Support Program satellites were deployed. Five or fewer remain active in geosynchronous orbit. They have been replaced by six Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) satellites launched between May 2011 and August 2022. Before that, in 2004, high elliptical orbit (HEO) sensors were added to two existing satellites to monitor circumpolar attack routes.
 
The SBIRS satellites represent significant upgrades:

  • Simultaneous scan-and-stare capability with higher sensitivity
  • Shortwave infrared and expanded mid-wave infrared sensors
  • Faster revisit rate (10 seconds or less) for suspicious objects
  • Enhanced communication with ground systems like Japan's AN/TPY-2 radars
  • Detection of ICBMs on mobile launchers with exact location data
  • Launch location triangulation from satellite and ground radar data back to the origin
  • Country of origin identification through acceleration profiles, speed, launch angles, and spectrographic analysis of exhaust plume chemical signatures ( There is a reference to the missile’s plume in the Situation Room but no follow up)
    ​
Total ICBM travel time from the Korean Peninsula to Chicago is approximately thirty-five minutes not twenty-two. Boost phase lasts three to five minutes (three for solid propellants, five for liquid). During the boost phase, irreversible trajectory is determined. The terminal phase where the warhead reenters the atmosphere is approximately two minutes. The remaining twenty-eight to thirty minutes are called the “midcourse.” And that is where the interception attempt in this movie takes place.”
 
Between 10:23 and 10:31 in the film, the bogey's position is given as 42.710°N, 137.14°E – the middle of the Sea of Japan -  with an elevation angle of 66.793 degrees. The missile had to be detected within a very short time because the sensors detected the lofted elevation angle which would have been early in the boost phase. Early because many say the booster is following a typical trajectory for a DPRK test and this belief is widely held by the Situation Room, Stratcom, Greely, and perhaps others. They are complacent. But while still in the boost phase Greely notices the rate of ascent is slowing while the inclination is flattening with velocity steady at 6km/sec (At 13:11)     

Indeed the elevation angle rapidly flattened from 66 degrees to 23 degrees, the optimal ICBM angle accounting for Earth's curvature. By 13:49 General Brady announces that the object will go sub-orbital landing somewhere in the US.  

Given that the Korean Peninsula is a known hotspot – meaning SBIRS satellites likely overlap sensors (stereo mode) and use staring capability – SBIRS failure to detect where the launch originated or identify country of origin strains credulity. A South Korean official confirmed ground radar has identified every Korean Peninsula launch over the past ten years.

Additionally, Planet Labs maintains a global network of commercial imaging satellites delivering daily high-resolution images (0.8 meters per pixel). This system detected a North Korean launch on May 4, 2018, and traced the missile plume to elongated structures near Wonsan. In November 2022, an open-source intelligence project using GPS tracking satellites tracked a North Korean missile immediately after launch. These aren't one-off detections – they’re routine.

No wonder Ana Park, the NSA's DPRK specialist, responds with disbelief when told the DSP satellite missed the launch: “You're fucking kidding me!” (55:37)

As previously stated at 13:55 in the film, General Brady announces impact will occur in the continental U.S. – but ninety seconds earlier, he says the object is somewhere over the Pacific with expected splashdown in the Sea of Japan. Impossible unless the bogey traveled east to west. Confusing. (at 12:35)
 
Issue 2: The Nineteen-Minute Countdown Problem
The nineteen-minute countdown makes no sense because the missile was detected in the boost phase likely three minutes or less after launch. We know this because the missile was being tracked before it dramatically changed trajectory. Moreover, since the trajectory must be determined in the boost phase, the US had at least thirty minutes for a countdown to “impact.” The word “impact” is also most likely a misnomer because most warheads are programmed for an airburst maximizing the blast area.

As stated,  an ICBM from the Korean Peninsula to Chicago requires about thirty-five minutes total flight time. Subtract a five-minute boost phase: the missile enters final ballistic trajectory at the thirty-minute mark. Even allowing two minutes for course determination, the countdown should read twenty-eight minutes minimum – not nineteen. There are nine to ten minutes missing. Perhaps it took ten minutes to get everyone on the same clock? Doubtful.

Issue 3: “We Missed” and the EKV Malfunction
Before addressing the unlikely EKV malfunction, we need to question why intercept operations centered on USSTRATCOM at Offutt Air Base, Omaha. Detection, assessment, and intercept tactics should originate at the Missile Warning Center (MWC) in Peterson Air Force Base, Cheyenne Mountain Space Force Station, Colorado. The only reference to “Cheyenne” is made from Greely (at 13:24) with no follow up. The Integrated Tactical Warning/Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) system operates from the MWC, which reports to United States Space Command (USSPACECOM), one of eleven combatant commands. The Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC IMD) also falls under USSPACECOM.

On May 23, 2024, U.S. Strategic Command officially transferred missile defense responsibility to USSPACECOM following an April 2023 presidential directive. This realignment made U.S. Space Command the global sensor manager, consolidating missile warning, missile defense, and space domain awareness under single command. These critical functions previously fell under USSTRATCOM. (On September 2, 2025, after filming concluded, USSPACECOM relocated to Huntsville, Alabama.)

Raw assessment data from MWC-ITW/AA would be communicated to the Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) HQ system at Schriever Space Force Base, Colorado Springs. Dynamically networked sensors there allow missile defense systems – Aegis, Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD), and various radars – to coordinate threat identification, engagement, and intercept across all flight phases.

A battery failure during FTG-07 GMD testing (July 2013) caused an EKV to fail separation from its missile. None of the other twenty-one tests attributed failure to separation issues. Only two tests conducted since 2018 (FTG-11 and FTG-12) resulted in successful kills. Developments during 2024 and 2025 centered on integrating the selectable 2/3 stage Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI), allowing earlier kill vehicle release and larger engagement area.

Why not deploy the 2/3 system with two missiles initially? If they miss, time remains to fire two more. Moreover, the warhead in A House of Dynamite deploys no decoys and isn't MIRV-equipped, making interception exponentially easier
 
Issue 4: Aegis System Intercepts of ICBMs Have Been Proven
The United States operates eighty-one active Aegis-capable ships. In November 2020, an SM-3 Block IIA missile from the destroyer John Finn received tracking orders from an external sensor through the C2BMC network and intercepted an ICBM warhead outside the atmosphere. In 2022, the Japanese Aegis Maya-class destroyer performed an exo-atmospheric intercept.

Japan operates eight Aegis destroyers. Properly positioned, any could have detected and differentiated the launch as an ICBM and possibly shot it down in the ballistic phase.

These ships carry ninety-six to 122 missiles of various types. Multiple vessels likely operated under the flight path shown in the film with good intercept chances, yet the Aegis system receives no mention. The average ICBM apogee is 750 miles. The SM-3 Block IIA can reportedly intercept targets above average ICBM apogees at distances exceeding 1,500 miles. Some ships would have been positioned in the Pacific with intercept capability. Even if the SM-3 Block IIA cannot intercept at 750-mile apogees, it certainly could engage during ascent or descent stages.
 
Issue 5: “Use it or lose it” – The Pressure on the President Defies Reality
The Triad
Sea-Based Deterrent
The United States operates eighteen Ohio-class submarines. Fourteen carry up to twenty UGM-133 Trident II missiles equipped with W-88 and W-76 warheads, each yielding between 100-475 kilotons – up to thirty-two times more powerful than Hiroshima’s “ Little Boy” fifteen kiloton atomic bomb. The film attributes twenty four missiles to the Ohio SSBNs which is incorrect. Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capabilities multiply warhead count by eight on some missiles. Britain operates four Vanguard nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) with sixteen Trident II D5 missiles (twelve MIRV-capable). France operates three to four Triomphant-class SSBNs, each carrying sixteen SLBMs (M45 or M51 missiles) with 150-300 kt warheads.
 
U.S. Land-Based Deterrent
The United States maintains 400 single-warhead silo-based Minuteman missiles with either W-78 335 kt yieldwarheads or W-87 300 kt warheads. They can launch within two minutes of authentication.
 
U.S. Air-Based Deterrent
The air-based deterrent relies mainly on B-2 bombers. Under the New START treaty (expiring February 2026), each B-2 counts as one warhead, but a single plane carries several B-61, B-83, or B-61-12 LEP bombs. These aircraft maintain constant alert with crews and weapons ready to launch on warning (LOW). Despite stealth capability, the film shows Russians detecting them near their airspace – likely accurate if Russian press releases are credible. The S-500 Prometheus surface-to-air missile defense system and newest radar systems (Container Over The Horizon and Voronezh) likely detected B-2 bombing raids over Iran, potentially providing sufficient warning to relocate enriched uranium. The U.S. operates approximately two thousand additional nuclear-capable aircraft, so detection's blunting effect of the B-2s, while considerable, shouldn't be overstated.

No attack subsequent to the single missile could prevent a large-scale U.S. retaliation, even accounting for follow- on attacks from Russian or Chinese submarines with seven-minute or less response windows, the retaliation would be massive.
 
Issue 6: The Authentication Sequence Is Wrong
The film's nuclear launch sequence for the US is inaccurate. Why does the President seemingly have only three options (“rare, medium, well done”)?

In reality, the President authenticates using the code from his Sealed Authenticator System (SAS) card (nicknamed the “biscuit”) with the National Military Command Center (NMCC) inside the Pentagon. He transmits orders to the NMCC – selecting from multiple options, certainly more than three. The film gives slight credence to multiple options, but many viewers likely left believing the President faces severely limited choices.

General Tony Brady at USSTRATCOM in Omaha would not receive orders directly from the President. NMCC would transmit to all relevant combatant commanders in highly coded messages. Brady's insistence on a presidential response ( “what are your orders Mr . President”) serves purely dramatic purposes and has no factual basis. The President transmits orders to the NMCC only and the other ten combatant commanders also receive their orders from NMCC not the President. 
 
Issue 7: The  Idea That There Is likely a Follow-On Attack Is Implausible
Why would Russia or China fire a single missile, raising U.S. alert to DEFCON 1 before initiating a major attack? The single missile caused the US to go to Defcon 1 which is exactly what Russia or China would not want if they were planning a follow-on attack. As Oppenheim's film often states: “This is insanity, not reality.” Only Russia and China possess ICBMs capable of delivering separating warheads beyond 6,000 miles.
 
Issue 8: Russian Sub loses Its Shadow
During heightened alert, a relatively noisy Russian submarine “slips its shadow” as the warhead enters descent phase – an occurrence that would give the Chief of Naval Operations gastric distress. Borei-class submarines are stealthier than Akula-class, but hydraulic pumps grow louder after short operation periods.
 
Issue 9: Impossible For A Remodeled Romeo To Have Fired The Missile
Ana Park suggests a remodeled Romeo-class submarine possibly fired the missile – a complete nonstarter. No currently deployable DPRK SLBM has a range exceeding 777 miles (Pukguksong-1); the missile boosted a warhead that traveled well over 6,000 miles. The Pukguksong -1 can’t do this. She then suggests the remodeled Romeo might have used a Chinese JL-3, Russian RSM-56 Bulava, or other Russian SLBM – but these missiles won't fit in any Romeo hull, remodeled or otherwise.
 
Issue 10: A Preemptive Attack Is Strategically Silly At This Point
General Brady asserts that a preemptive strike will target enemy bombers, offensive weapons, and command centers (1:02:50 mark).  Such an offensive might capture some aircraft and command centers, but unless all eleven Russian SSBNs and all six Chinese nuclear submarines disappear simultaneously, America faces devastating retaliation should they follow Brady’s predilection for preemption.

The preemption strategy is questionable. The U.S. is already at DEFCON 1. A Preemptive strike offers no advantage. China has repositioned destroyers, launched jets, and convened high-level government conferences. Communication with Russia means they've implemented every precaution against preemptive strikes. No one will be surprised. Utilizing major attack options like MA-07 or MA-09 would kill three billion or more within weeks.
 
Issue 11: Bolt Out Of The Blue
The lone missile attack is suspect. A bolt from the blue without geopolitical tension strains believability. Even accepting unprovoked launch – why only one missile?  A plausible buildup to a geopolitical conflict is detailed in China Thermonuclear Conflagration 2029: Worldwide Nuclear Winter. 
 
Issue 12: No One Will Make It To Raven Rock By Bus
A House of Dynamite ends with scores of people scrambling to Raven Rock, a Pennsylvania nuclear war bunker. Helicopter passengers might arrive. Bus and car travelers would not – China and Russia (elevated to DEFCON 1 equivalent) would obliterate the United States within thirty-five minutes of our preemptory attack. Also, why isn't the President on Air Force One with a full suite of national defense options?
 
Issue 13: Greatly Exaggerated Death Toll
The Chicago death count is wildly inflated. Assuming the incoming warhead is nuclear and detonates at optimal airburst height with the maximum yield allowed under the New START Treaty (475 kt), casualties would fall below one million. Science historian Alex Wellerstein's NUKEMAP calculates 511,000 deaths. Yet the film shows the President authenticating major attack destined to leave few planetary survivors without determining whether the warhead is conventional or nuclear or who fired it.
 
Conclusion
A House of Dynamite entertains but fails its authenticity claims repeatedly. I believe Bigelow and Oppenheim attempted authenticity and relayed what they believed to be truth, but they fell short technically. As entertainment, it's a fine evening's viewing. But don't use this film as a research basis for U.S. nuclear capabilities and tactics.
 
Thomas J. Yeggy
https://www.thomasjyeggy.com/

]]><![CDATA[Nuclear War: A Scenario by Annie Jacobsen – A Review]]>Tue, 23 Dec 2025 02:41:16 GMThttps://www.thomasjyeggy.com/blog/nuclear-war-a-scenario-by-annie-jacobsen-a-reviewNuclear War: A Scenario by Annie Jacobsen – A Review
 
Introduction
By now, many of you are familiar with Annie Jacobsen’s books. She has won just about every accolade a writer could want, including a New York Times bestseller and a Pulitzer Prize finalist. Her works on nuclear war are so respected that only a few dare challenge the scenarios in her books. Jacobsen claims that Nuclear War: A Scenario is a nonfiction, realistic depiction of how cascading events could lead to an all-out nuclear war.
So why am I taking the time to comment on her latest book, Nuclear War: A Scenario? Let me explain. Annie Jacobsen lays claim to a realistic series of events about nuclear war based on interviews and consultations with former military generals, cabinet members, and self-proclaimed experts, but she has managed to belie the facts to the American public. 

Several common threads run through her dogma on nuclear warfare. I will occasionally refer to my previous article criticizing film director Kathryn Bigelow and scriptwriter Noah Oppenheim for their film A House of Dynamite, which depicts a similar scenario. 

Jacobsen, who has appeared on Joe Rogan’s podcasts several times, has a long-tenured writing career on military matters that at times gives way to a risible regard for her credibility. (See nbcnews.com/science/cosmic-log/were-soviets-behind-roswell-ufo-flna6c10403209.) Nonetheless, she is where populist America has turned for its briefing on nuclear war, primarily due to the media’s push to anoint a leader. While we need a leader for this important message, we need one with facts that are beyond question. I have some concerns about what I perceive to be inaccuracies in Jacobsen’s book. If you look behind the curtain, you will see that most if not all her advisors are ancient in terms of nuclear war where technology and strategy are changing rapidly.
 
What Air University Press Says
According to Air University Press (https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/AUPress/Book-Reviews/Display/Article/4300576/nuclear-war-a-scenario/):

Despite its strengths, the book has notable limitations. Chief among them is its speculative framing. The scenario Jacobsen presents is a worst-case trajectory with little room for de-escalation, diplomatic intervention, or fail-safes within real-world nuclear policy. While the scenario is grounded in legitimate concerns, its determinism risks reinforcing a narrative of inevitability rather than a preventable catastrophe. In doing so, it may obscure the tools that states have developed to manage escalation, such as back-channel communication, crisis signaling, and regional deconfliction.
Additionally, the book simplifies institutional complexity. Though Jacobsen references key components like US Strategic Command and the National Military Command Center, she largely omits the layers of interagency coordination, legal safeguards, and Allied engagement that shape real nuclear decision-making. Extended deterrence strategies involving Japan, South Korea, and NATO are barely addressed, even though they are central to the contemporary deterrence environment. The portrayal of nuclear authority as a linear and fast-moving chain from launch detection to retaliation glosses over the procedural and bureaucratic realities that, while imperfect, are designed to prevent rash or mistaken decisions.
 
My Comments: Nuclear War: A Scenario Is Impossible 
General Comments
  1. Part I of Nuclear War: A Scenario recounts the history of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP)—the United States’ plan from 1961 to 2003 for a preemptive but not preventative nuclear strike. But it compares SIOP to Nazi genocide, which according to one reviewer is unseemly. Yes, SIOP was a massive overkill of an adversary that was also nuclear armed, but it was not genocide.

  2. The attack in both A House of Dynamite (the movie) and Nuclear War: A Scenario (the book) is an out-of-the-blue attack that even Jacobsen admits is nonsensical. In both the movie and the book, the attack by North Korea is an extremely limited attack that certainly would not have achieved decapitation.

  3. Jacobsen constantly pushes the notion that the United States must respond in a very limited time, which for Jacobsen amounts to six minutes. In the movie, the President is constantly pushed for his “orders” while pressing the idea that the retaliatory strike must be done at once or the United States will lose its ability to retaliate at all. For reasons stated in my critique of the movie, such immediacy is lunacy and only contributes to what everyone is trying to avoid—worldwide nuclear war. Russia possesses twelve nuclear-armed submarines, so in the book when the President of the Russian Federation is pushed for an order for an attack because of incoming warheads, the scenario loses credibility.

  4. Jacobsen does get credit for using Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) satellites to detect the launch and determine its origin within one second of launch. However, in the movie, outdated Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites are mistakenly utilized, maintaining that we don’t know exactly who fired the missile. In the book, we know it is headed for the United States fifteen seconds into the launch. It takes much longer in the movie. The book is correct. The movie is not. The book knows it is going to hit the East Coast within thirty seconds of launch. The movie takes much longer to determine where the missile is headed.

Specific Reasons the Scenario Is Impossible
  1. Jacobsen uses the Hwasong-17 (HWS-17) intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) to boost a 1 megaton bus (a warhead reentry vehicle that sometimes contains decoys—chaff, etc.) 6,800 miles to Washington, DC. The first problem is that the highest-yielding nuclear warhead that North Korea likely has is 10–20 kilotons (see Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists).

  2. The second problem is that the HWS-17 can’t get that heavy of a bus (1 megaton) or even a 1 megaton warhead without chaff and decoys to accurately target and hit the Pentagon in Washington, DC. The circular error probability (CEP) of this missile with a warhead over 1,000 kg is hundreds of meters and not meant to be a precision weapon for taking out fortified targets. So it is unlikely that it could hit the Pentagon and destroy the National Military Command Center—a central thesis of the book—with a warhead that North Korea could build because the yield would be multiples less than 1 megaton.

  3. Because of the limited supply of weapons-grade material, experts on nuclear weapons estimate that North Korea, as of 2024, has approximately fifty warheads in the 10–20 kiloton range. On July 14, 2024, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists published the article “North Korean Nuclear Weapons, 2024” by Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns, and Mackenzie Knight, in which they stated: 

While North Korea’s warhead design and stockpile makeup are unknown, it is possible that most weapons would likely be single-stage fission weapons with yields possibly between 10 and 20 kilotons of TNT equivalent, akin to those demonstrated in the 2013 and 2016 tests, and a smaller number would be composite-core single-stage warheads with a higher yield. Such an arsenal would also be consistent with the understanding that North Korea has a limited plutonium supply and prioritizes shorter-range nuclear weapons capabilities over long-range strategic weapons.   https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2024.2365013#d1e206 

  1. Jacobsen believes that the four Ground-Based Interceptors would all miss. That’s possible, but very unlikely. While critics typically use the total number of interceptions since 2002 to measure effectiveness, they often ignore recent improvements and performance over the last ten years, though debated, has hit 100 percent. So, if you say the effective rate on March 30, 2024, was 60 percent, then the odds that all four would miss are about 16 in 600, or 2.6 percent. Also, this warhead does not have decoys of chaff, making interception easier.

  2.  Jacobsen writes, “And so, decades later, we’re still here.” With Launch on Warning (LOW) in effect, that is just not the case. In the book, all we have is one incoming missile from North Korea and a second from a 1950s submarine. The President has time to determine if more missiles are being fired, even from offshore submarines. 

The Sub-Firing Second Missile Could Not Have Gone Undetected and Would Have Been Blown Out of the Water 
The Korean Peoples Navy (KPN) has only one or possibly two diesel electric submersible ships ballistic (SSB) that have been remodeled. The sub that Jacobsen is talking about in her book is likely the Romeo Class Hero Kim Kun Ok (Hull No. 841). It draws extra scrutiny when it leaves port because of its claimed but unproven capability to launch a Korean KN-23 with a nuclear warhead 400 miles. As of mid-2025, there haven’t been any extensive sea trials necessary to confirm its reliability and missile capability in a combat scenario. Even remodeled, it likely gives off 140 decibels when snorkeling, making it detectable for hundreds of miles.

  1. Jacobsen posits that the second missile that hits the Diablo Canyon Power Plant has been launched by a modified Romeo class submarine traveling at about 5 knots per hour (5 x 1.15 = 5.75 mph) for 5,000–6,000 nautical miles. That means the sub would have to travel undetected forty-five to fifty days. Theodore Postol, professor emeritus at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), is Jacobsen’s go-to guy when she needs to legitimize an otherwise extremely unlikely event. He obliges her in many areas of the book. Throughout the years, Postol has made some controversial claims, so perhaps we need to take his claim with a grain of salt that the Romeo could have made the trip undetected. (See:  https://www.reuters.com/world/latest-north-korean-missile-sparks-new-debate-over-possible-russian-role-2023-08-18/#:~:text=SEOUL/WASHINGTON%2C%20Aug%2018%20(,technical%20cooperation%20sourced%20to%20Russia)

  2. Here is why the scenario in the book has a less-than-slim chance of occurring.

    A. The remodeled Romeo has given up half its battery space for missile tubes. It is not equipped with a modern Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) system that enables modern diesel electric submarines to stay submerged for a week or more. That means it must snorkel to recharge its batteries for six out of every forty-eight hours. The reduction in battery power would likely reduce its cruising speed to 4 knots per hour, causing it to run out of fuel or food before it reaches its firing position.

    B. If indeed the trip is one where the sub hugs the coastline to avoid detection, as Postol posits, the trip is close to 6,950 nautical miles, not 5,000–6,000, making it even more likely that the crew would run out of food and fuel before reaching its destination 350 miles from Avila Beach in San Luis Obispo County, California. In shallow water the proximity of the seabed and the hull create a drag called the “confined water effect.” In addition, a submarine in shallow water experiences the “squat effect” necessitating trims by the bow or stern while moving. Finally, evasive maneuvers would often be necessary. All these factors would suck massive amounts of fuel from a boat built primarily for surface travel.

    C. The warhead attached to the KN-23 missile is likely a Hwasan-31 nicknamed “Olive” with a maximum yield of 20 kilotons, not a 300-kiloton warhead that is in the book.  

    D. The Romeo likely would be detected and followed when it left port in the Sea of Japan due to the extra scrutiny it would draw and the extraordinary capabilities of the Japanese Navy.
    ​
  3. Japanese detection: The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) does the following:

    A. Maintains an extraordinary network of fixed undersea hydrophone arrays.

    B. Operates a dedicated class of Hibiki class ocean surveillance ships dedicated to submarine detection using a surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS).

    C. Maintains an integrated system of hull-mounted sonar and towed arrays from surface ships that are connected with the US system.

    D. Keeps unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) equipped with advanced sonar suites and long-range underwater acoustic communication systems.

    E. Operates a robust maritime patrol that deploys helicopters (Mitsubishi SH-60K) and Kawasaki P-1 fixed wing aircraft dedicated to submarine detection. 

US Detection
Even if the 841 Romeo class makes it to Alaska undetected (highly unlikely), it still must make it undetected from Alaska to a position 350 miles from Avila Beach, California. To do that, Jacobsen says it “hugs the continental shelf along Alaska and then heads south.” It cannot cross the open ocean undetected from Alaska to within 300 miles of our California coast for several reasons.

  1. The Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS), with its sensitive passive sonar that includes seabed sonar arrays and other fixed sensors, can track the Romeo’s overall acoustic signature from machinery, propellers, and pumps when it enters operational areas. Three hundred miles from our coastline means the Romeo has entered the open ocean where passive sonar configurations such as the IUSS will certainly detect it. 

  2. Destroyers (US DDG 51 class) and frigates that are equipped with advanced hull-mounted and sonar array systems—such as the AN/SQQ-89. Virginia class submarines utilizing BQQ-10 sonar, Large Aperture Bow (LAB) sonar array, wide aperture lightweight fiber optic sonar array, high-frequency active sonars, and a high frequency Low Cost Conformal Array (LCCA), acting as part of the coastal US Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) program—would detect the Romeo. A KPN sub this far from its normal waters would pique the interest of the MDA.

  3. The United States deploys at least twenty-five of the deadly Virginia class and twenty-three Los Angeles class submarines specifically designed to hunt and track subs, often tailing them from their home ports.
    ​
  4. Hugging the coastline route will draw extra scrutiny. This route forces the submarine into a more confined, predictable area that is heavily monitored by coastal sensors.

  5. In Jacobsen’s scenario in the book, US forces have been on high alert for nineteen minutes, and it is extremely likely that the 841 has a Virginia class attack submarine for a shadow. That means the US attack sub can hear the Romeo preparing to fire a missile and will destroy it immediately. It is even more likely that the minute North Korea is identified as the nation that fired the HS-17, the Romeo will cease to exist.

ICBM Flight Time from Wyoming to Russia – Thirty Minutes
We can’t contact Russia, but oddly enough in the book, a farmer (spy) in Wyoming gets through to the Russian Federation’s spy agency—the Main Directorate of the General Staff (GU)—to leave a message. 
For some inexplicable reason, the United States has chosen to fly its missiles over Russia, despite not being able to contact them in advance. Both the inability to contact them and then flying the missiles over Russia are unbelievable.

To make the book’s scenario plausible, we must believe that Putin is hiding in Siberia (unlikely). It is equally unlikely that the Russian counterparts hang up or refuse to exchange meaningful information with their American counterparts. And it is simply untrue that Russia’s Tundra satellites, Over-the-Horizon (OTH) radar, Don-2N, and Voronezh radar fail to give Russia time to determine the number and trajectory of the incoming warheads. 
The United States launched twenty-four minutes after the North Korean launch. By the time we get to forty-four minutes after the launch, the fifty warheads launched by the US Minuteman missiles have been in the air for eighteen to twenty minutes, which is more than enough time for the Russian Federation to determine that the Minuteman’s target is not Russia and that the number of incoming warheads is 82, not 182. 
Here is shorthand for what Russia really sees and thinks.

  1. Russia knows the United States has been hit with two missiles. It believes the United States knows that a decapitation out-of-the-blue strike by Russia would involve hundreds if not thousands of sophisticated Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) missiles.

  2. Russia’s Tundra satellites pick up the launch of both the Minuteman and Trident missiles seconds after launch and expect they are headed for Korea.

  3. Ten to fifteen minutes into the Minuteman's flight, the aforementioned radars have separated the warheads from the chaff and determined that North Korea is the target. Modern radar systems use a Doppler effect filtering that measures the relative velocity of targets and can filter out targets that do not maintain the high velocity consistent with an incoming warhead. Russia’s X-Band radars, like our AN/TPY-2, can clearly identify warheads from decoys and chaff. Multi-static networks like Russia’s also use several angles to distinguish decoys from warheads. Russia would not believe that the United States was hitting them with just 182 warheads.

While I applaud Annie Jacobsen’s effort and enjoyed reading Nuclear War: A Scenario, it needs a heavy disclaimer so readers are not misled to believe that this scenario could happen. The scenario depicted in the book is not only technologically impossible (e.g., the inability of the HWS-17 to thrust a 1 megaton bus with a warhead into an orbit that would hit the Pentagon) but also suffers from the very odd two-warhead bolt-out-of-the-blue attempt at decapitation.
​
What I found intriguing in the book was the pace at which the story was told and the author’s largely accurate depiction of the devastation and dire consequences of nuclear war. Perhaps if the author had provided a geopolitical event that led to a full-scale nuclear exchange, the book would have been better.
 
Thomas J. Yeggy
Thomasjyeggy.com
Upn42@yahoo.com

]]><![CDATA[Mushroom Cloud Earns BookTrib’s Acclaim]]>Sun, 14 Sep 2025 14:33:28 GMThttps://www.thomasjyeggy.com/blog/mushroom-cloud-earns-booktribs-acclaim
On October 2, 2023, BookTrib, a respected platform for literary discovery, shone a spotlight on this gripping work, proclaiming it “perfect for fans of Oppenheimer” and lauding its gritty, authentic portrayal of the atomic age. Even in 2025, as global tensions underscore the relevance of nuclear history, this recognition resonates as a testament to the novel’s enduring power.

​BookTrib’s feature celebrates Mushroom Cloud as a meticulously crafted narrative that weaves historical accuracy with moral complexity, offering a compelling case for its place among the finest works of military fiction. This post explores the significance of BookTrib’s praise, the novel’s immersive storytelling, and its vital connection to a world still grappling with the lessons of the past.

BookTrib’s Recognition: A Milestone for Historical Fiction

BookTrib’s feature, titled “Perfect for Fans of Oppenheimer, This Author’s Gritty Historical Novel Is All-Too-Real,” highlights Mushroom Cloud as a standout in the genre. The platform, known for championing stories that provoke thought and spark conversation, praises Yeggy’s ability to blend fact-based history with dynamic characters and high-stakes drama. The article positions the novel as a natural companion to Oppenheimer, the cinematic exploration of the Manhattan Project, noting its capacity to immerse audiences in the Cold War’s nuclear arms race with a realism that feels both urgent and haunting.

​This accolade underscores the novel’s unique strength: its ability to transform historical events into a narrative that feels alive and immediate. BookTrib emphasizes the “painstaking research” behind Mushroom Cloud, particularly its depiction of two fictional CIA operations grounded in declassified facts from the Cuban Missile Crisis era. This authenticity, paired with a plot that navigates espionage, ethical dilemmas, and the specter of global catastrophe, makes the book a persuasive addition to any collection of historical or military fiction. The feature serves as a powerful endorsement, affirming the novel’s ability to captivate and educate in equal measure.

The Heart of Mushroom Cloud: Dr. Caleb Young’s Moral Struggle

At the core of Mushroom Cloud lies Dr. Caleb Young, a brilliant physicist and CIA chief science officer whose journey anchors the narrative. Drawing inspiration from real-life figures like James Killian and Edward Purcell, Yeggy crafts Caleb as a composite of the scientists who shaped the nuclear era, wrestling with the moral weight of their creations. BookTrib highlights Caleb’s “ethical odyssey,” noting how his commitment to averting a catastrophic global conflict drives the story through a landscape of covert operations and political intrigue.

​Set against the backdrop of the late 1950s and early 1960s, the novel revisits pivotal moments like the Cuban Missile Crisis, where the world stood on the brink of nuclear war. Yeggy’s portrayal of the U.S.-Soviet nuclear imbalance—marked by America’s advantage in deliverable atomic bombs and thermonuclear warheads—adds a layer of historical grit. BookTrib praises this balance of fact and fiction, noting how the novel’s intimate focus on Caleb’s decisions mirrors the real-life pressures faced by those navigating the Cold War’s darkest hours. This narrative approach makes Mushroom Cloud a compelling exploration of leadership, sacrifice, and the human cost of power, resonating with anyone drawn to stories that probe the intersection of science and morality.

Thomas J. Yeggy: A Storyteller Rooted in History

BookTrib’s feature also celebrates Thomas J. Yeggy’s remarkable journey as an author. A University of Iowa Law graduate with a distinguished career as a mental health judge, Yeggy authored over 1,500 judicial opinions before turning to fiction. Now based in Pensacola Beach, Florida, where he spends summers with his wife Eileen and their grandchildren, Yeggy channels a lifelong passion for history into his First Strike series, with Mushroom Cloud as its powerful opener. Published on July 17, 2023, by Parallax Publishing, the 380-page novel reflects years of research into the nuclear arms race and philosophical influences from thinkers like Hobbes and Kant.

​The BookTrib article captures Yeggy’s inspiration, sparked by documentaries on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and fueled by declassified Cuban Missile Crisis files. His horror at the devastating potential of nuclear weapons, coupled with a realization that military leaders often underestimated their danger, shapes the novel’s urgent tone. A striking moment from the feature quotes Yeggy recounting Edwin Land’s bold observation to military brass: “Here we were, a half dozen science geeks asking questions... and these guys with enough ribbons on their chest to accessorize an Easter parade have no clue.” This blend of wit and gravitas underscores Yeggy’s ability to craft a narrative that feels both accessible and profound, making Mushroom Cloud a persuasive choice for those seeking stories with intellectual depth.

A Timeless Narrative for 2025 and Beyond

In September 2025, BookTrib’s endorsement of Mushroom Cloud remains strikingly relevant. As global discussions on nuclear non-proliferation and geopolitical strategies persist, the novel serves as a poignant reminder of history’s enduring lessons. BookTrib opens its feature with Albert Einstein’s sobering words: “The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking and we thus drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.” Yeggy’s narrative echoes this sentiment, weaving “egalitarian and altruistic concepts” into Caleb’s journey, as BookTrib notes, to challenge the reliance on violence as a solution to conflict.

​The novel’s emotional and intellectual impact lies in its ability to humanize the Cold War’s complexities. By focusing on individuals like Caleb, who defy unchecked power for the greater good, Mushroom Cloud invites reflection on leadership and diplomacy in times of crisis. Its historical authenticity—bolstered by detailed logistics reminiscent of real Cold War strike plans, as seen in earlier posts on this blog—grounds the fiction in a reality that feels both thrilling and sobering. BookTrib’s praise aligns with other accolades, including the novel’s #1 ranking in Amazon’s New Releases for Nuclear Weapons and Warfare History and its Literary Titan Book Award, cementing its status as a must-read.

A Celebration of Literary Impact​

BookTrib’s recognition of Mushroom Cloud is more than a literary milestone; it’s a celebration of a novel that bridges the gap between historical fact and gripping fiction. The feature underscores Yeggy’s ability to craft a story that entertains while provoking vital conversations about power, morality, and peace. For those captivated by Oppenheimer’s exploration of the atomic age or drawn to narratives that blend espionage with ethical stakes, Mushroom Cloud offers a fresh perspective on a pivotal era.
As the first installment of the First Strike series, the novel sets the stage for a broader exploration of an ideal society, culminating in Armageddon. Its blend of historical rigor, philosophical depth, and narrative intensity makes it a standout, as BookTrib persuasively argues. Available on Amazon and other retailers, Mushroom Cloud invites exploration of a world where every decision carries the weight of history. This book is not just a story—it’s a journey into the heart of humanity’s greatest challenges, offering lessons that echo far beyond its pages.
Get Mushroom Cloud Now​
Get First strike series now
]]><![CDATA[China Thermonuclear Conflagration 2029: #1 on Amazon Military Science History]]>Wed, 20 Aug 2025 07:00:00 GMThttps://www.thomasjyeggy.com/blog/china-thermonuclear-1-on-amazonOn August 20, 2025, this captivating novel claimed the coveted #1 spot in Amazon’s Hot New Releases for Military Science History, a testament to its gripping narrative and timely exploration of a future shaped by nuclear tensions. Nestled among a competitive field of titles, its rise to the top reflects a growing appetite for stories that blend historical depth with speculative foresight.

​This achievement, captured in a snapshot of Amazon’s rankings, underscores the novel’s ability to captivate readers and spark curiosity about the complexities of global conflict. As the pages of history continue to unfold, China Thermonuclear Conflagration 2029 stands as a beacon of literary excellence, inviting a closer look at its compelling world and the masterful storytelling of its author.

Picture

A Milestone Worth Celebrating: #1 in a Prestigious Category

The sight of China Thermonuclear Conflagration 2029 perched at #1 in Military Science History on Amazon’s Hot New Releases list is a moment of pride for fans and a warm nod to Yeggy’s dedication. This category features a lineup of works that delve into the intricacies of warfare, strategy, and technological evolution. To rise above titles like China Thermonuclear Conflagration 2029’s peers—each vying for attention with fresh perspectives and bold covers—is no small feat. The novel’s ascent on August 20, 2025, signals its resonance with readers hungry for narratives that bridge the past and future, offering a persuasive case for its place among the genre’s finest.
​
What sets this achievement apart is the context of the ranking. Surrounded by diverse offerings, from technical analyses to historical retrospectives, China Thermonuclear Conflagration 2029 stands out with its imaginative yet grounded approach. The Amazon snapshot reveals a vibrant marketplace, yet Yeggy’s work claims the top spot, a clear indicator of its ability to engage and inspire. This milestone beckons enthusiasts of military fiction to explore a story that promises not just entertainment but a thoughtful examination of humanity’s relationship with power and technology.

A Journey into a Bold Future: The Essence of the Narrative

At the heart of China Thermonuclear Conflagration 2029 lies a richly woven tale that projects current geopolitical dynamics into a speculative 2029. Thomas J. Yeggy, a storyteller with a keen eye for historical detail, crafts a narrative that imagines a thermonuclear confrontation rooted in the escalating tensions between global powers. The novel builds on the legacy of his First Strike series, including Mushroom Cloud, but ventures into uncharted territory with a futuristic lens. This forward-thinking approach, paired with Yeggy’s signature blend of fact and fiction, creates a world where strategy, ethics, and survival intertwine in thrilling harmony.
​
The story draws inspiration from today’s headlines, where China’s nuclear advancements—documented in reports of a growing arsenal and innovative weaponry—fuel a narrative of high stakes and moral ambiguity. Yeggy’s meticulous research shines through, offering readers a plausible vision of a future conflict that feels both distant and uncomfortably close. The novel’s characters navigate a landscape of covert operations and diplomatic brinkmanship, echoing the Cold War tensions of Mushroom Cloud while introducing new challenges posed by advanced technology. This persuasive blend of realism and imagination makes China Thermonuclear Conflagration 2029 a must-explore for anyone fascinated by the evolution of warfare and its human cost.

​Thomas J. Yeggy: A Visionary Voice in Military Fiction

Thomas J. Yeggy’s journey as an author continues to inspire, with China Thermonuclear Conflagration 2029 marking another chapter in his impressive career. A University of Iowa Law graduate and former mental health judge, Yeggy brings a wealth of experience to his writing, having penned over 1,500 judicial opinions with a remarkable success rate. Now residing in Pensacola Beach, Florida, alongside his wife Eileen, he channels his curiosity into narratives that resonate with depth and authenticity. His transition from the courtroom to the page, fueled by a passion for history sparked by documentaries on nuclear devastation, has yielded a series that captivates and educates.
​
Yeggy’s approach to China Thermonuclear Conflagration 2029 reflects his commitment to exploring the human dimensions of conflict. Drawing on his background and a lifetime of intellectual pursuits, he infuses the novel with philosophical undertones, inviting reflection on leadership and morality in the face of annihilation. This personal investment, combined with his proven track record—evident in Mushroom Cloud’s earlier successes—lends the book a warm credibility that beckons readers to dive in. For those who admire authors who live richly beyond their stories, Yeggy’s multifaceted life adds an inviting layer to the narrative’s appeal.

Timely Relevance in a Shifting World

As of September 2025, China Thermonuclear Conflagration 2029’s #1 ranking feels especially poignant. The novel’s speculative framework aligns with ongoing global conversations about nuclear proliferation and China’s military modernization, themes that have gained urgency in recent years. Reports of China’s expanding arsenal, projected to reach significant warhead counts by the decade’s end, provide a sobering backdrop to Yeggy’s vision. This timely relevance transforms the book into more than a fictional escape—it becomes a mirror reflecting the stakes of today’s geopolitical landscape.
​
The novel’s exploration of thermonuclear strategy and its human toll offers a persuasive argument for its importance. By imagining a 2029 where past decisions shape future crises, Yeggy echoes the historical lessons of the Cold War, making the story a gentle yet compelling call to understand the past’s influence on the present. Its success on Amazon underscores a collective interest in narratives that prepare us for what lies ahead, cementing China Thermonuclear Conflagration 2029 as a vital contribution to military science history.

​A Literary Victory Worth Exploring

The #1 ranking of China Thermonuclear Conflagration 2029 on August 20, 2025, is more than a commercial triumph—it’s a celebration of a novel that marries imagination with insight. Thomas J. Yeggy’s ability to craft a story that captivates while provoking thought positions this work as a standout in its genre. For enthusiasts of Mushroom Cloud or anyone drawn to the interplay of history and speculation, this book offers a fresh perspective on a world teetering on the edge of transformation.
​
Available now on Amazon, China Thermonuclear Conflagration 2029 invites a journey into a future shaped by the echoes of the past. Its pages hold the promise of thrilling encounters, moral dilemmas, and a vision of society tested by its own ingenuity. This literary victory beckons as a testament to Yeggy’s skill and a compelling reason to explore a narrative that continues to rise in prominence.
Get the book now
Picture
]]><![CDATA[Part V: Checkpoint Charlie and the Draft Presidential Memorandum]]>Sat, 09 Dec 2023 17:49:08 GMThttps://www.thomasjyeggy.com/blog/checkpoint-charlie-and-the-draft-presidential-memorandum
1961's Doomsday Countdown: Tanks, Tensions, and Top-Secret Plans Revealed! Uncover the pulse-pounding brinkmanship at Checkpoint Charlie that nearly sparked World War III. Dive into the clandestine Draft Presidential Memorandum of October 28, 1961, and discover the shocking alternative plan that could have changed history. 

Checkpoint Charlie and the
​Draft Presidential Memorandum

Dated October 28, 1961

As Tensions Continued to Grow, Plan B Was Developed

A.    After the building of the Berlin Wall during August and September of 1961, President Kennedy thought October might usher in a calmer period among the superpowers. “Better a wall than a war,” he was heard to remark. But his hopes for any lessening of the tensions were to be short-lived.

B. After the building of the wall, military and diplomatic personnel from the Western powers passed through checkpoints along the wall in the city of Berlin. The East German police attempted to stop and request identification from US personnel passing through these checkpoints. The United States responded by having armored military personnel escort diplomats through these gates. Khrushchev, who had been angered by Kennedy’s July 25 speech and subsequent buildup of the US military in Western Europe, decided to put a stop to the US show of force in Berlin. On October 27, the Soviets moved thirty-three tanks into position at Checkpoint Charlie to block the entrance of US personnel until they showed the East German police their credentials. The US called in ten tanks of their own. For the next seventeen hours, forty-three tanks with live rounds loaded stood ready to kick off World War III. NATO, the US garrison in West Berlin, and the Strategic Air Command raised their alert levels. The Soviet checkpoint had direct communications with General Anatoly Gribkov at the Soviet Army High Command, who was on the phone with Khrushchev. Kennedy was on the phone with General Lucius Clay, his military advisor in Berlin. It is against this backdrop that Kennedy received DPM on 10/28/1961 that contemplated a revision to the original Kaysen-Rowen limited counterforce surprise attack plan. Although some may doubt whether Kennedy would have pulled the trigger, he undoubtedly had this revised plan as an alternative and may have requested this update as tensions rose in Berlin at Checkpoint Charlie. As terrible as the concept sounds, there are many reasons why a surprise attack by the United States made sense in 1962. I will attempt to make a rational case for the unthinkable.

C. . Both sides knew that a significant advantage would be gained by the side that struck first. In my blog and books, I have detailed many comments to that effect from both military and civilian leaders. If the United States was convinced that the Soviets would strike, a preemptive US counterforce strike would save tens of millions of lives on both sides. Kaysen and Rowen estimated as few as one million lives would be lost in a US preventative strike.

D.  A deep distrust permeated the relationship. A decision to make a first strike is easily made in a dictatorship and conversely difficult in a republic. So this calculus brings a reality into focus where a Soviet first strike would be relatively more difficult to detect and would have disregard for civilian casualties. The Soviet attack would therefore include countervalue as well as counterforce targets. That eventuality must be avoided even at the cost of the one or two million Soviet lives lost in the Kaysen plan. Was a Soviet attack likely? Oleg Penkovsky, a trusted GRU defector, had passed on to US intelligence the fact that operation Buria conducted in October 1961, involving millions of Soviet troops, was a prelude to a Soviet first strike. The hostilities over Berlin persisted into 1962 with Soviet planes dropping chaff and buzzing allied planes in their air corridors. Commenting on the Berlin situation, Bobby Kennedy stated, “I don’t think people really understood around the country. The president felt strongly, and I did, that we were very close to war at the time.” The Soviets resumed atmospheric nuclear testing and set off the 50 Mt tsar bomb on October 30, 1961. Finally, I will make an analysis of the weapons cycle that greatly favored the United States on September 1, 1962.

E. There was a submarine disparity. By May 1962, the United States had eight Polaris laden submarines, each carrying sixteen ballistic missiles with a range up to 1,700 miles. Those missiles could be fired from a submerged position. The Soviets, on the other hand, had eight Hotel class submarines with D2 launchers featuring R13 missiles that had a range of 370 miles and carried 1–2 Mt warheads but had to surface to fire the missiles. In addition, the Soviets had six Zulu and three early Golf class submarines that were capable of firing R-11 FM missiles with a range of 110 miles. Finally, the Soviets had twenty-one golf project 629 submarines with D2 launchers and R13 missiles. However, the key to the submarine situation would change drastically in December 1963 when the Hotel Class II and Golf Class II submarines started carrying a D4 launcher with an R-21 missile capable of being fired from a submerged position with a range up to 900 miles and carrying a 1 Mt warhead.

F.    What was the readiness of liquid-fueled ICBMs versus solid-fueled ICBMs? The only MRBMs and ICBMs available to the Soviets on September 1, 1962, were fueled by liquid oxygen (LOX) and kerosene. These missiles could not be fueled and kept in a ready state for more than thirty days. Fueling, warming up the electrical systems, and loading the warhead took three to six hours at a minimum. You could not load and reload the fuel since once it was loaded, the missile was spent due to the corrosive qualities of the fuel. Polaris missiles were solid fueled. The United States recognized that solid fueled missiles were the future and by July 1962 had deployed the LGM-30 minuteman, a solid-fueled ICBM. The minuteman could be fired within 15 minutes of a launch order, was highly accurate with a CEP 1.1 (nm) and carried a .8 MT W-59 warhead. The US also had more than 150 of the less dependable Atlas and Titan I ICBMs available.  Joint control of the MRBMs in England, Italy and Turkey would prohibit their use in a preventive attack.

G.    The striking power of the United States was greatly enhanced when the aircraft carrier USS Forrestal came out of dry dock in February 1962 and the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise joined the second fleet in the Atlantic in June 1962. That gave the United States two modern aircraft carriers for a northern attack and two modern carriers for a southern approach. The four aircraft carriers brought more than 200 nuclear-capable bombers to the region. The CV-61 Ranger would be deployed in the southern region of the Sea of Okhotsk to target Russia's eastern bases.

H.   Finally, more than fifty B-47s were available to take off from Spanish bases and be deployed to forward bases in Germany where their nearly 1,000-mile combat radius put them in a perfect position to take out MRBM sites, Tu-16 bases, and major Soviet armor installations, substantially reducing the exposure of US NATO allies to a knee-jerk retaliation once Soviet strategic counterforce targets were taken out.

I.    From an ideological standpoint, Khrushchev had presented his Cuban missile plan to the Presidium from May 21–24, 1962. The plan won unanimous approval. Khrushchev also sent combat planes and pilots to Egypt, attempting to gain influence in an area contested by the United States. Clearly a collision course had been set. The United States could have acted to implement a first strike counterforce plan had it heeded CIA Director John McCone’s warnings during the summer of 1962 that the Soviets were installing offensive weapons in Cuba. This dangerous action on the part of Khrushchev, if taken seriously by Kennedy would have provided adequate cause for a preventative attack. But of course, just because you can do something doesn’t mean you should. On the other hand, apprising yourself of your opponent’s continued ruthless enslavement of over 100 million Central Europeans at the point of a bayonet argues for intervention on behalf of those countries. It is entirely possible that a much smaller number would have been killed by this limited strike than by the GRU and KGB over the next thirty years.

J.    Primary Targets for B-52s – The Six Suspected ICBM Sites – Six Planes (N) Two (s) and Two (W).

K.    Plesetsk Cosmodrome 62°55′32″N 40°34′40″E ICBM #2 VIP (N)

L.    Tyuratam-Baikonur 45°39’N 63°18’50”E ICBM four launch sites #2 VIP(S)

M.   Verkhnyaya Salda 58°02’44” N 60°33’12” E VIP (N)

N.    Yoshkar-Ola 56°37’59” N 47°52’00” E VIP (N)

O.    Kostroma 57°46’05”N 40°55’37”E ICBM #2 VIP(N)

P.    YurYa 59°02’N 49°16’E ICBM #2 VIP (N)
Primary Targets for B-52s
Q.    Eight Tu-95 and several M-4 Home Bases and Dispersal Bases:
  1. Dolon (MB), aka Chagan and Semipalitinsk Dolon, 50°32′N 079°11′0″E, Tu-95, Tu95, 3M, and M-4 VIP (W)
  2. Engels-2 51°28′52″N 046°12′38″E M-4 and the 3M VIP (N)
  3. Uzyn Air Base 49°47′25″N 30°26′27″E, Tu-95K stand-off missile carriers starting in 1959 VIP (N)
  4. Dyagilevo (MB) 54°38′30″N 039°34′18″E M-4 VIP (N)
  5. Ukrainka Air Base 51°10′12″N 128°26′42″E – in 1955, Ukrainka was one of only six Soviet bases capable of handling the Myasishchev M-4 (NATO: Bison) bomber VIP (W)
  6. Mozdok 43°47′15″N 44°36′11″E, Tu-95 base VIP (S)
  7. Lebedovo 51°17′0″N 046°15′0″E, dispersal site for bombers from Engels during high tension VIP (N)
  8. Mengon (SB) 50°02’00” 136°18’00”E, dispersal base VIP (S)
  9. Tiski 71°41′51″N 128°54′10″E, Tu-95 staging base
  10. Tiski North 72°2′18″N 128°28′18″E, Tu-95 staging base
  11. Tiski West 71°41′36″N 128°41′0″E, Tu-95 staging base
  12. Vozdvizhenka aka Ussuriysk 43°54′44″N 131°55′04″E, Pacific Long Range Bomber Fleet Tu-16 VIP
  13. Aspidnoye (SB) aka Dresba-Krumaya 69°21′48″N 161°33′42″E, Arctic staging base for Tu-95 and Tu-16 VIP
  14. Belaya (MB) aka Srednii 52°54′54″N 103°34′30″E, Tu-4A, Tu-16, Tu-16K
Home Bases and Dispersal Bases

Carriers: CV-59 Forrestal in Barents; CV-60 Saratoga in Agean; CV-61 Ranger in Sea of Okhotsk; CV-62 Independence in Adriatic; CV-65 Enterprise in North Sea
(note that the Forrestal was in dry dock until February 1962, and the Enterprise joined the Atlantic Fleet in June 1962). 
This surprise attack takes place on September 1, 1962. At that time, McCone had warned the Kennedy administration that offensive weapons were being placed in Cuba but not yet operational. An investigation would have revealed this subterfuge and set the stage for the preventive attack that would be impossible seven weeks later when the Russians became apprised of the fact that the United States was aware of their lies and thus went on a high stage of alert.. The majority of the Golf and Hotel class SSBM submarines were in their pens for repairs while the Barents Sea was passable on September 1, 1962.

Care has to be taken that the carriers remain safe from the P-15 Termit, the K-10S, and the AS-1 anti-carrier missiles even though the reliability and accuracy are poor. Forces should not be grouped so as to alert the early warning stations in North Africa and northeast Europe.

​The Enterprise and the Forrestal would be striking mainly Northern and Baltic fleet forces with A4D-2N (A-4C) Skyhawks Night/adverse weather version of A4D-2, with AN/APG-53A radar, autopilot, and a (LABS) low-altitude bombing system. The Wright J65-W-20 engine with 8,200 lbf (36 kN) of takeoff thrust was redesignated A-4C in 1962, 638 were built. It would carry the B-43, a lighweight (2,200 lbs) 1.4 Mt thermonuclear bomb.

Specification of Douglas A4D-2N/A-4C Skyhawk

Engine: One Wright J65-W-16 turbojet, rated at 7,700 lbs.
Performance: maximum speed 657 mph at 4,000 feet; cruising speed 496 mph; stalling speed 140 mph.
Combat ceiling: 44,000 feet (clean), 40,000 feet with a single Mk.28 nuclear weapon.
Initial climb rate: 7,100 feet per minute. An altitude of 20,000 feet could be attained in 4.5 minutes with a single Mk 28. Combat range: 1,140 miles (clean).
Dimensions: wingspan 27 feet 6 inches.
Length: 40 feet 1 inch; height: 15 feet; wing area: 260 square feet;
Weights: 9,146 pounds empty, 15,359 pounds combat weight, 17,535 pounds gross, 22,500 pounds maximum; armament: two 20 mm cannons with 100 rpg; three underwing pylons; primarily coastal targets.
  • A3D-2 (A-3B): Definitive production bomber version with stronger airframe, more powerful engines, slightly larger wing area (812 ft²/75 m2 versus 779 ft²/72 m2), provision for in-flight refueling reel for tanker role. The final twenty-one built had a new AN/ASB-7 bombing system, a reshaped nose, a deleted tail turret in favor of electronic warfare installation with the following performance characteristics:
    • Maximum speed: 530 kn (610 mph, 980 km/h) at 10,000 ft (3,000 m)
    • Cruise speed: 520 kn (600 mph, 960 km/h)
    • Range: 1,825 nmi (2,100 mi, 3,380 km)
    • Ferry range: 2,520 nmi (2,900 mi, 4,670 km)
    • Service ceiling: 41,000 ft (12,000 m)
    • g limits: +3.4
    • Wing loading: 86.2 lb/sq ft (421 kg/m2)
    • Thrust/weight: 0.357
    • Armament
    • Guns: 2 × 20 mmM3L cannon in the tail turret
    • Bombs: 12,800 pounds (5,800 kg) of free-fall bombs or mines, including any combination of
      • 12 × 500 pounds (230 kg) Mark 82 bombs or
      • 6 × 1,000 pounds (450 kg) Mark 83 bombs or
      • 8 × 1,600 pounds (730 kg) armor-piercing bombs or
      • 4 × 2,000 pounds (910 kg) bombs
      • 1 × free-fall nuclear weapon
  • A3J-1/A-5A Vigilante: (deployed 6-61; low-level attacks at high speeds); two squadrons, the VAH-7 and VAH-1, deployed on the Enterprise from August 3 to October 11, 1962 
    • Maximum speed: 1,149 kn (1,322 mph, 2,128 km/h) at 40,000 ft (12,000 m)
    • Maximum speed: Mach 2
    • Combat range: 974 nmi (1,121 mi, 1,804 km) (to target and return)
    • Ferry range: 1,571 nmi (1,808 mi, 2,909 km)
    • Service ceiling: 52,100 ft (15,900 m)
    • Rate of climb: 8,000 ft/min (41 m/s)
    • Wing loading: 80.4 lb/sq ft (393 kg/m2)
    • Thrust/weight: 0.72
    • Armament
    • Bombs:
      • 1× B27, B28 or B43 freefall nuclear bomb in internal weapons bay
      • 2× B43, Mark 83, or Mark 84 bombs on two external hardpoints

Coastal and Interior Targets for Carrier Planes

Enterprise and Forrestal :

  1. Vidyayevo, aka Ura Bay, Northern Fleet Naval Base 69°19′N 32°48′E, diesel-powered subs
  2. Polyarnyy 69°12’N 33°28’E
  3. Ura Bay Naval Base 69°19′N 32°48′E, and Ara Bay (#2)
  4. Severomorsk 69.0690°N, 33.4082°E, Northern Fleet home base
  5. Zapadnaya Lista aka Bolshaya Lopatka (Lista Guba) 69°25’N 32°26’E, nuclear sub base
  6. Malaya Lopatka-Bolshaya Lopatka 69°26'12"N 32°25'30"E, only 2 miles apart – main sub base
  7. Olenya (SB) near Skalisty less than 2 miles NE 68°09′06″N 033°28′12″E, Tu-22 first detected in 1957 and served as forward staging base; many SAM sites in this area, also Naval base
  8. Gadzhiyevo aka Yagelnaya Guba 69.258878° 33.335251°, located on the eastern shore of Guba Sayda (Sayda Bay), Murmanskaya Oblast Naval Base Northern Fleet
  9. Soltsy Air Base 58°8′48″N 030°19′54″E (#6)
  10. Ostrovnoy (Gremikha-Yokanga) 68°03′N 39°30′E, main service base for nuclear subs
  11. Severodvinsk 64°34′N 39°52′E
  12. Arkhangelsk 64°26’N 40°23’E (see also Lakhta I Naval base 64°23′0″N 40°43′0″E, Tu-16 base) (see also Arkhangelsk/Yagoon 64°24’N 40°54’E)
  13. Belmorsk 64°31’N 34°46’E, submarine base VIP
  14. Baltiysk Naval Base 54°39'16.38"N 19°54'33.44"E
  15. Karosta-Leipaja (submarines) 56°33′0″N 21°0′20″E, Baltic Fleets 14th Submarine Squadron
  16. Bykhov 53°31’N 30°12’E, one on 1956 target list, (East Germany) VIP
  17. Ozerne (MB) 50°9′30″N 028°44′18″E, 15th Guard’s Heavy Bomber Division Tu-16
  18. Baranovichi (MB) 53°5′7″N 26°2′8″E (Belarus), Tu-16 base deployed Tu-16 bombers to Tiski and onward to ice station SP-6
  19. Dyagilevo (MB) 54°38′30″N 039°34′18″E M-4 VIP
  20. Pochinok 54°20′24″N 032°28′24″E
  21. Seshcha 53°43’N 033°21’E
  22. Ostrov/Gorokhovo 57°18′0″N 028°26′0″E, Tu-16K and Tu-16Z
  23. Soltsy Air Base 58°8′48″N 030°19′54″E, Tu-22
  24. Bobruysk 53°6′17″N 29°12′21″E, threat to NATO allies
  25. Melitopol 46°52′36″N 035°18′27″E
  26. Tartu 58°24’N 026°46E
  27. Minsk-Machulische 53°46′25″N 027°34′38″E
  28. Pryluky Air Base 50°34′0″N 032°19′0″E, Tu-16 medium bombers
  29. Poltava Air Base 49°37′37″N 034°29′11″E, Tu-16
  30. Zhitomir/Skomorokhi 50°10’N 028°44’E
  31. Orsha/Orsha S.W. 54°26’N 30°17’E
  32. Gomel/Pribytki 52°18’N 031°10’E
  33. Leningrad Air Control Center 60°03’N 030°11’E
  34. Moscow/Bykovo Command and Control 55°37’N 38°03’E
Enterprise and Forrestal Targets

Saratoga and Independence Targets:

The Saratoga (Aegean Sea) and the Independence (Adriatic) would utilize a similar component of planes to strike similar types of targets. In some cases, there would be a duplication of targets. They would also strike troops, airborne bases, and mechanized units within the reach of their carriers. Like any war plan it would change on the fly.

  1. Tyuratam-Baikonur 45°39’N 63°18’50”E ICBM four launch sites #2 VIP
  2. Belaya/Tserkov aka Bila Tserkva 49°47′46″N 30°01′28″E, heavy bomber base Tu-16 and later Tu-16N
  3. Uzyn Air Base 49°47′25″N 30°26′27″E, Tu-95K stand-off missile carriers starting in 1959 VIP
  4. Spassk-Dalny Airfield 44°36′47″N 132°53′13″E, Tu-16
  5. Mozdok 43°47′15″N 44°36′11″E, Tu-95 base VIP
  6. Melitopol 46°52′36″N 035°18′27″E
  7. Sevastopol 44°36′28″N 33°31′48″E Black Sea Fleet VIP
  8. Balaklava Crimea 44°29′56″N 33°35′46″E, submarine pen deeply fortified needs Mt or more (hidden subs in cave) VIP
  9. Pryluky Air Base 50°34′0″N 032°19′0″E, Tu-16 medium bombers
  10. Poltava Air Base 49°37′37″N 034°29′11″E, Tu-16
  11. Zhitomir/Skomorokhi 50°10’N 028°44’E
  12. Poltava Air Base 49°37′37″N 034°29′11″E, Tu-16
Saratoga and Independence Targets

The B-47s would be devoted to MRBM sites from the Baltic to the ukraine. Fifty to one hundred of those sites have been identified. Note that Wunsdorf has to be hit with conventional weapons because of its proximity to Berlin. Below are a few examples:

b-47
At sites located close to NATO bases, a surface burst of a smaller nuclear weapon would be used. It should also be noted that the attack could be carried out with only two aircraft carriers, each with 40 A-4Cs and 15 A-5As because of the lack of strategic targets as noted in the opinion section below.
​

Ballistic Missile Submarines:

  1. George Washington 16 A-1, 1,400 miles, 1 Mt warhead
  2. Patrick Henry 16 A-1, 1,400 miles, 1 Mt warhead
  3. Theodore Roosevelt 16 A-1, 1,400 miles, 1 Mt Warhead
  4. Robert E. Lee 16 A-1, 1,400 miles, 1 Mt warhead
  5. Abraham Lincoln 16 A-1, 1,400 miles, 1 Mt warhead
Located in the Barents Sea, giving all five enough range to reach Moscow and /or Leningrad.

Ethan Allen Class:

All three have the A-2 missile with a 1,725-mile range and a 1 Mt warhead, located in the Adriatic or Aegean Sea, giving them enough range to reach Moscow, Leningrad, or other opportunistic targets.
  • Ethan Allen SSBN-608
  • Sam Houston SSBN-609
  • Thomas A. Edison SSBN-610
The major drawback is the accuracy of the Polaris A-1 and A-2, each having a circular error probability of 2.2 miles, which means they would not be suitable for any hardened targets and might only be useful after the initial attack to threaten cities to force surrender. Also, the Sam Houston and Thomas A. Edison would be forced into service without completing full training but were far enough along to be functional for this mission.
All ICBms and the remaining 725 B-52s would be held back as negotiations for surrender would have taken place after the second wave which would inclue all non-B-52 assets above. 

Conclusion

​Carl Kaysen was interviewed by Marc Trachtenberg, David Rosenberg, and Stephen Van Evera in 1988. During that interview, Kaysen disclosed that he and Rowen were aghast at the carnage inherent in SIOP-62 and concluded, after presenting their plan to Robert McNamara, that “we knew that there were only 6 or 7 operational ones (missiles) and 3 or 4 more in the test sites and so on. As for the Soviet bombers, they were in a very low state of alert. . . . And the answer was that in 1961 we could have made sure, with a high level of confidence to disarm the Soviets in this way, there was no need to execute the whole SAC mission.”

In the end, Kennedy and McNamara decided against the plan because “there were just too many things that could go wrong.” But had Live Oak failed to open the autobahn, my guess is that there would have been renewed consideration of this plan in light of the US rejection of TNWs as an alternative in 1957.

Opinion

Both plans in their totality constitute massive overkill. Ten B-52H bombers alone could have taken out the less than twenty strategic targets in 1961-1962. The 10-28-61 DPM may have recognized that and provided all the other assets to take out Moscow and Leningrad if the Soviets fired on London or Paris. Taking out the command-and-control systems begs the question as to how the Soviets contact all of the MRBM sites and tell them the war is over. Kennedy and McNamara knew that "in the fog of war" any plan would face many other unforseen problems as well and thankfully Khrushchev knew that he could not push the young American President to the precipice.   ​
Picture
Go to part IV
Picture
get the books now
]]><![CDATA[Part IV Continued: Logistics for the Kaysen-Rowen Plan]]>Sat, 09 Dec 2023 14:18:19 GMThttps://www.thomasjyeggy.com/blog/logistics-kaysen-rowen-plan-continued
Here would be a great area from the Elbe to Vladivostok . . . torn up and destroyed, without government, without its communications, just an area of starvation and disaster. I ask you what would the civilized world do about it?
—General Dwight David Eisenhower
​addressing the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1954
F.    ​4136th Strategic Wing, Minot AFB, North Dakota, 525th Bombardment Squadron flying B-52H, twelve planes flying northern route

Plane #1 Dusty; #2 Billy; #3 Krider

Targets:

  1. Belaya/Tserkov aka Bila Tserkva 49°47′46″N 30°01′28″E, heavy bomber base Tu-16 and later Tu-16N
  2. Uzyn Air Base 49°47′25″N 30°26′27″E, Tu-95K stand-off missile carriers starting in 1959VIP
  3. Ozerne (MB) 50°9′30″N 028°44′18″E, 15th Guard’s Heavy Bomber Division Tu-16
  4. Baranovichi (MB) 53°5′7″N 26°2′8″E (Belarus), Tu-16 base deployed Tu-16 bombers to Tiski and onward to ice station SP-6
Plane #1 Dusty; #2 Billy; #3 Krider

Plane #4 Dark; #5 Past; #6 Ingry

Targets:

  1. Dyagilevo (MB) 54°38′30″N 039°34′18″E M-4 VIP
  2. Lebedovo 51°17′0″N 046°15′0″E, dispersal site for bombers from Engels during high tension VIP
  3. Leningrad Air Control Center 60°03’N 030°11’E (use AGM –Hound Dog from 200 miles out) VIP
Plane #4 Dark; #5 Past; #6 Ingry

Plane #7 Zack; #8 Harp; #9 Kern

Targets:

  1. Moscow/Bykovo Command and Control 55°37’N 38°03’E (use AGM – Hound Dog from 200 miles out) VIP
  2. Pochinok 54°20′24″N 032°28′24″E
  3. Seshcha 53°43’N 033°21’E
Plane #7 Zack; #8 Harp; #9 Kern

Plane #10 Kaster; #11 Loaster

Targets:

  1. Ostrov/Gorokhovo 57°18′0″N 028°26′0″E, Tu-16K and Tu-16Z
  2. Soltsy Air Base 58°8′48″N 030°19′54″E, Tu-22
  3. Bobruysk 53°6′17″N 29°12′21″E, threat to NATO allies
Plane #10 Kaster; #11 Loaster

Plane #12 Nymaster in Reserve

G.    379th Bombardment Wing, Wurtsmith AFB, Michigan, 524th Bombardment Squadron, twelve B-52H planes, six flying on southern route, and six on western route

Western Route Planes

Plane #1 Stein

Target:

  1. Tiski 71°41′51″N 128°54′10″E, Tu-95 staging base
  2. Tiski North 72°2′18″N 128°28′18″E, Tu-95 staging base
  3. Tiski West 71°41′36″N 128°41′0″E, Tu-95 staging base
Plane #1 Stein

Plane #2 Blemer; #3 Gasper

Targets:

  1. Ukrainka Air Base 51°10′12″N 128°26′42″E in 1955, one of only six Soviet bases capable of handling the Myasishchev M-4 (NATO: Bison) bomber VIP
  2. Vozdvizhenka aka Ussuriysk 43°54′44″N 131°55′04″E, Pacific Long Range Bomber Fleet Tu-16 VIP
  3. Aspidnoye (SB) aka Dresba-Krumaya 69°21′48″N 161°33′42″E, Arctic staging base for Tu-95 and Tu-16 VIP
Plane #2 Blemer; #3 Gasper

Plane #4 Carter; #5 Cline

Targets:

  1. Belaya (MB) aka Srednii 52°54′54″N 103°34′30″E, Tu-4A, Tu-16, Tu-16K
  2. Mengon (SB) 50°02’00” 136°18’00”E, dispersal base VIP
  3. Spassk-Dalny Airfield 44°36′47″N 132°53′13″E, Tu-16
  4. Bechevinka 53°16′21″N 159°47′04″E, Pacific Submarine Base VIP
Plane #4 Carter; #5 Cline

Plane #6 Lars in Reserve

Southern Route Planes

Plane #1 Baset

Target:

1. Tyuratam-Baikonur 45°39’N 63°18’50”E ICBM four launch sites #2 VIP
Plane #1 Baset

Plane #2 Crank; #3 Opel; #4 Kirstin; #5 Edwards

Targets:

​1. Mozdok 43°47′15″N 44°36′11″E, Tu-95 base VIP
2. Melitopol 46°52′36″N 035°18′27″E
3. Sevastopol 44°36′28″N 33°31′48″E Black Sea Fleet VIP
4. Balaklava Crimea 44°29′56″N 33°35′46″E, submarine pen deeply fortified needs Mt or more (hidden subs in cave) VIP
Plane #2 Crank; #3 Opel; #4 Kirstin; #5 Edwards

Plane # 6 Girder in Reserve

H.    42nd Bombardment Wing, Loring AFB, Maine, flying seven B-52G planes, on northern route

Plane #1 Mauser; #2 Weston

Targets:

​1. Tartu 58°24’N 026°46E
2. Minsk-Machulische 53°46′25″N 027°34′38″E
3. Bobruysk 53°6′17″N 29°12′21″E, threat to NATO allies
4. Pryluky Air Base 50°34′0″N 032°19′0″E, Tu-16 medium bombers
Plane #1 Mauser; #2 Weston

Plane #3 Houser; #4 Caldwell

Targets:

1. Poltava Air Base 49°37′37″N 034°29′11″E, Tu-16
2. Zhitomir/Skomorokhi 50°10’N 028°44’E
3. Poltava Air Base 49°37′37″N 034°29′11″E, Tu-16
Plane #3 Houser; #4 Caldwell

Plane #5 Paul; #6 Lisk

Targets:

1. Bykhov 53°31’N 30°12’E, one 1959 target list
2. Orsha/Orsha S.W. 54°26’N 30°17’E
3. Gomel/Pribytki 52°18’N 031°10’E
Plane #5 Paul; #6 Lisk

II. Revision of the Kaysen-Rowen Plan

Between the time Kaysen and Rowen submitted their plan to McNamara and the JCS on 09/05/1961 and the submission of the DPM from McNamara to Kennedy dated 10/28/1961, substantial changes to the Kaysen-Rowen limited counterforce strike had been made. A review of footnote #35 from David A. Rosenberg’s “More Bang for the Buck” 1994 article found in Part III of this series reveals that General David A. Burchinal, then USAF Director of Plans, related that access to the planning was extremely limited. Burchinal also related that individual units for participation had been identified. The revised limited counterforce plan was likely scaled back by Burchinal and staff to ten B-52s to preserve the initial element of surprise and recognition that no more than twenty-six DGZs were critical to US safety and only about twelve targets (six ICBMs and six Tu-95s and M-4 bases) represented an immediate threat. The follow-on forces envisioned by the DPM offered more of a chance to protect US NATO allies by taking out MRBMs, more Tu-16 bases, and TNWs. Moreover, the changes simplified geographical logistics by significantly shortening strike routes and delivery times, thereby enhancing the ability to handle difficult timing issues.
End Part IV
thomas yeggy books
get the books now
]]><![CDATA[Part IV: Logistics for the Kaysen-Rowen Plan]]>Thu, 07 Dec 2023 21:38:47 GMThttps://www.thomasjyeggy.com/blog/logistics-kaysen-rowen-plan
The Logistics Masterpiece: Kaysen-Rowen Plan Exposed! Brace yourself for a journey into the heart of strategic brilliance and covert operations. From B-52Gs to B-52H turbofan-equipped missions, discover the untold secrets that shook the very foundations of planning. Ready to decode the blueprint behind the game-changing Kaysen-Rowen Plan?
Here would be a great area from the Elbe to Vladivostok . . . torn up and destroyed, without government, without its communications, just an area of starvation and disaster. I ask you what would the civilized world do about it?
—General Dwight David Eisenhower
​addressing the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1954

The Kakysen-Rowen Plan Employing Only Fifty-Five B-52s

A.    The original plan utilizing 55 B52s: We are adding two primary ICBM sites per NIE 11-8/1-61 dated 09/21/1961. Even though Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) Historian Lt. Colonel Sergei Karlov concluded that by late 1962 the SRF had only four active SS-6s at Plestek with two reserve SS-6s at Baikonur and no other ICBMs, US intelligence indicated six possible sites in late 1961, including the following:
  1. Verkhnyaya Salda 58°02’44” N 60°33’12” E
  2. Yoshkar-Ola 56°37’59” N 47°52’00” E
A
B.    Timing is not included in this plan, but once the B-52s dropped below the low altitude P-15 detection level of 900 feet, you can assume 400–450 mph, meaning the planes bombing deep interior targets such as Verkhnyaya Salda and Dolon would enter Soviet airspace three to four hours ahead of the planes bombing coastal areas. Interior bound planes could utilize the AGM Hound Dogs to hit targets, if necessary. Unless otherwise utilized, planes with coastal targets could use the AGMs to hit secondary targets. For example, Bobcat, Sammy, Kadell, and Lance could strike targets 200 miles to as many as 400 miles farther inland if the interior planes targeting those bases were shot down.

C.    Soviet early warning Radar-P-35M (Bar–Lock 2D E band and/F Band) had a range of 217 miles, so a lower altitude approach would have to begin at least 250 miles off the nearest land mass.

D.   4038th Strategic Wing, Dow AFB, Maine, 341st Bombardment Squadron, twelve B-52Gs flying northern route carrying either four B-28FI 1.4 Mt bombs or four B-43 1 Mt bombs (normally eleven in a group but one “trailer” for each group). All planes in this and all other squadrons received Modification 1000 updates that included Hound Dogs, ADM-20 Quail decoys, TAR upgrades, and advanced electronic countermeasures. Operation Chrome Dome began in November 1961 and was preceded by Cover All, Clear Road, Keen Axe, and Wire Brush.
Each plane could opportunistically hit four targets, including any of the more than 110 MRBM sites threatening Europe that spread from the Baltic to Southern Ukraine. This plan would have been launched after a failure to open the autobahn by Live Oak or the use of TNWs by either side. The KGB had warned Khrushchev in late 1961 that Kennedy was going to use whatever means necessary to repel the Soviet plan to take over Berlin. 

Plane #1 Bobcat; #2 Sammy; #3 Kadell; #4 Lance; #5 Crown; #6 Regency

Targets:

  1. Vidyayevo, aka Ura Bay, Northern Fleet Naval Base 69°19′N 32°48′E, diesel-powered subs 
  2. Polyarnyy 69°12’N 33°28’E 
  3. Ura Bay Naval Base 69°19′N 32°48′E and Ara Bay (#2)
  4. Severomorsk 69.0690°N, 33.4082°E, Northern Fleet home base
  5. Zapadnaya Lista aka Bolshaya Lopatka (Lista Guba) 69°25’N 32°26’E, nuclear sub base
  6. Malaya Lopatka-Bolshaya Lopatka 69°26'12"N 32°25'30"E, only 2 miles apart; main sub base
  7. Olenya (SB) near Skalisty less than 2 miles NE 68°09′06″N 033°28′12″E, Tu-22 first detected in 1957 and served as forward staging base; many SAM sites in this area, also Naval base
  8. Gadzhiyevo aka Yagelnaya Guba 69.258878° 33.335251°, located on the eastern shore of Guba Sayda (Sayda Bay), Murmanskaya Oblast Naval Base Northern Fleet
  9. Soltsy Air Base 58°8′48″N 030°19′54″E (#6)
Plane #1 Bobcat; #2 Sammy; #3 Kadell; #4 Lance; #5 Crown; #6 Regency

Plane #7 Babe; #8 Mantle

Targets:

  1. Ostrovnoy (Gremikha-Yokanga) 68°03′N 39°30′E, main service base for nuclear subs 
  2. Severodvinsk 64°34′N 39°52′E 
  3. Arkhangelsk 64°26’N 40°23’E (see also Lakhta I Naval base 64°23′0″N 40°43′0″E, Tu-16 base) (see also Arkhangelsk/Yagoon 64°24’N 40°54’E)
  4. Belmorsk 64°31’N 34°46’E, submarine base VIP
Plane #7 Babe; #8 Mantle

Plane #9 Killebrew; #10 Carson; #11 Zimmer

Targets:

  1. Baltiysk Naval Base 54°39'16.38"N 19°54'33.44"E
  2. Karosta-Leipaja (submarines) 56°33′0″N 21°0′20″E, Baltic Fleets 14th Submarine Squadron VIP
  3. Siauliai Air Base 55°53′38″N 023°23′41″E, Staging for M-4 bombers that can reach US VIP
  4. Bykhov 53°31’N 30°12’E, one on 1956 target list, (East Germany) VIP
Plane #9 Killebrew; #10 Carson; #11 Zimmer

Plane #12 Riddell, Plane in Reserve

E.    4042nd Strategic Wing, K. I. Sawyer AFB, Michigan, flying B-52H, twelve planes flying the northern route. The H models were equipped with the new TF33-P-3 turbofans, increasing the combat radius to 4,176 nautical miles with a 10,000-pound bomb load compared to the 3,550 nautical miles for the G models. The range was reduced in this operation for both models due to excess drag at lower altitudes, but with IFR and with US bases surrounding the Soviet Union, the low altitude required did not affect the mission. H models are assigned the more difficult and important targets.

Plane #1 Hansen; #2 Miller

Target:

  1. Plesetsk Cosmodrome 62°55′32″N 40°34′40″E ICBM #2 VIP
Plane #1 Hansen; #2 Miller

Plane #3 Dunway; #4 Rivet

Target:

  1. YurYa 59°02’N 49°16’E ICBM #2 VIP
Plane #3 Dunway; #4 Rivet

Plane #5 Kite; #6 Jake; #7 Border

Targets:

  1. Verkhnyaya Salda 58°02’44” N 60°33’12” E VIP
  2. Yoshkar-Ola 56°37’59” N 47°52’00” E VIP
  3. Dolon (MB) aka Chagan and Semipalitinsk Dolon 50°32′N 079°11′0″E, Tu-95, Tu95, 3M and M-4 VIP
Plane #5 Kite; #6 Jake; #7 Border

Plane # 8 Lowery; #9 Kelce

Targets:

  1. Kostroma 57°46’05”N 40°55’37”E ICBM #2 VIP
  2. Engels-2 51°28′52″N 046°12′38″E M-4 and the 3M VIP
Plane # 8 Lowery; #9 Kelce

Plane #10 Powers; #11 Turner

Target:

  1. Tyuratam-Baikonur 45°39’N 63°18’50”E ICBM four launch sites #2 VIP
Plane #10 Powers; #11 Turner

See Part IV Continued in Next Blog
Picture
get the books now
]]><![CDATA[PART III A: The Carl Kaysen–Henry Rowen Attack Plan Logistics (9/5/1961)]]>Sat, 04 Nov 2023 22:02:29 GMThttps://www.thomasjyeggy.com/blog/attack-plan-logistics
Uncover the logistics of the Carl Kaysen–Henry Rowen 9/5/1961 Attack Plan, a chilling Cold War military strategy. Explore the intricacies of the plan's weapon systems, primary targets, and potential consequences. Dive into the historical details of this intense period in world history.
You can’t have this kind of war. There just aren’t enough bulldozers to scrape the bodies off the streets.
—Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953
The dynamics of the 1961 Berlin Crisis between the United States and the Soviet Union resulted in a military plan called Live Oak. The plan called for the US military to open the autobahn to Berlin by conventional force if it was closed by the East Germans after the Soviet Union handed over governance to the East Germans. The Nato forces would commit as many as seven divisions in an effort to open the Autobahn. If the Soviets utilized their twenty divisions in East Germany the next step would involve tactical nuclear weapons.(https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_136184.htm.)The plan was a graduated escalation to general war and saw no logical end other than a mutual suicide pact. Perhaps Dean Acheson unwittingly described this modality best during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
​
In 1962, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Dean Acheson had a verbal exchange with the Executive Committee (ExCom), exposing the primary problems with Live Oak. He had portrayed himself as an expert on the Berlin situation by delivering a lengthy memo in June 1961 that was circulated widely in the Kennedy Administration. Now, Acheson burst into the Cabinet Room and forcefully stated that we should take out Russia’s missiles in Cuba. This is the type of conversation that would have taken place during the Berlin 61 Crisis during such events as the building of the wall on August 13,1961 if for example Lauris Norstad had his way and the US would have knocked the wall down.

“Well, what will they do then?” someone queried.

Acheson responded, “I know the Soviet Union well. I know what they are required to do in light of their history and their posture around the world. I think they will knock out our missiles in Turkey.”

“Well, then, what do we do?” the person asked.

Acheson replied quickly, “I believe under our NATO treaty, with which I was associated, we would be required to respond by knocking out a missile base inside the Soviet Union.”

“Then what will they do?” queried another member of ExCom.

“That’s when we hope that cooler heads will prevail, and they'll stop and talk,” Acheson stated.

No one had any idea how or when to employ nuclear weapons even during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Some have questioned the October 28, 1961, draft presidential memorandum as inconsistent with a successful attack because it only utilized 10 B-52s. Because most targets were in western Russia, it was not difficult for the four aircraft carriers and the ten Polaris submarines to get within range of several important targets. The B-47s to be used were located at three bases in Spain but could be forward staged in Germany. I will explore those logistics in Part V.

One important point needs to be reinforced before we proceed. The Tu-16, even from the most optimal forward staging bases, had insufficient range to reach the United States loaded with even one nuclear bomb on a one-way mission. Despite that fact, the target list contains numerous Tu-16 bases.This is inconsistent with the purpose of the counterforce plans to force surrender. I believe those bases were included to assuage European fears discussed in previous joint plans. But could the 2nd wave eliminate all the medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) sites? Probably not even though the 2nd wave constituted massive firepower. These MRBM sites presented a grave danger to the NATO alliance and may have resulted in 35 million European deaths even if only five of the nearly 100 sites were missed.
​
Finally, we should realize that the list of 1,100 targets released through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) was based on 1956 information. Contrast that with the sixty-two targets selected by the Kaysen-Rowen plan based on 1961 information that utilized not only U-2 photos but more importantly discoverer satellite photos. I believe that if the attack came out of the blue, the target list would be twenty -six or fewer strategic targets. Even so, I have included many Tu-16 air bases because they fit into the plan, and a few Tu-95 or 3M bombers could be located at those bases.

The Kaysen-Rowen Plan Logistics Including Follow on Forces and Expanded targets

1. Weapons Systems
A. B-52 units – fifty-five B-52 G and H models

  1. 4038th Strategic Wing, Dow AFB, Maine, 341st Bombardment Squadron, twelve B-52Gs flying northern route
  2. 4042nd Strategic Wing, K. I. Sawyer AFB, Michigan, flying B-52H, twelve planes flying northern route
  3. 4136th Strategic Wing, Minot AFB, North Dakota, 525th Bombardment Squadron flying B-52H, twelve planes flying southern route
  4. 379th Bombardment Wing, Wurtsmith AFB, Michigan, 524th Bombardment Squadron, twelve planes flying B-52H on southern route
  5. 42nd Bombardment Wing, Loring AFB, Maine, flying seven B-52G planes, two on western route and five on northern route 
B. Twenty-five B-47Es carrying four B-28 (1.1–1.45 Mt each) with a 2,100–2,359 combat radius from the following bases:
  1. Norvenich 50°49′54″N 006°39′30″E
  2. Erding 48°19′21″N 011°56′55″E
  3. Buchel 50°10′35″N 007°03′28″E
  4. Wiesbaden 50°02′58″N 08°19′28″E
  5. Ramstein 49°26’21”N 007°36’02”E
C. Five George Washington Polaris ballistic missile subs located at various locations in the Barents Sea. The missile range, 1,400 miles for A-1 polaris missiles

D. Three Ethan Allen Classs Polaris ballistic missile submarines located in the Adriatic and Agean  with missile range of 1,700 miles for A-2

E. The following five aircraft carriers located in the Mediterranean, the Pacific, the North Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean: USS Independence CV-62 Adriatic; USS Forrestal CV-59 Barents, USS Saratoga CV-60 Agean, USS Ranger Okhotsk Sea, USS Enterprise CVN-65 North Sea

F. Forty-five Jupiter missiles in Turkey and Italy; 1,500-mile range, 1.15–1.44 Mt W-49 warhead
​
G. Sixty Thor missiles located in England, 2,000-mile range, 1.1–1.44 Mt W-49 warhead
NOT ALL THESE WEAPON SYSTEMS WOULD OR COULD  BE USED. IN Part V  WE WILL PAIR WEAPONS AND TARGETS CONSISTENT WITH THE KAYSEN OR 10-28-61 DPM.

2. Primary Targets
A. ICBM sites to be taken out by B-52H planes from #2, the 4042nd Strategic Wing
  1. Tyuratam-Baikonur 45°39’N 63°18’50”E ICBM four launch sites #2
  2. Plesetsk Cosmodrome 62°55′32″N 40°34′40″E ICBM #2
  3. YurYa 59°02’N 49°16’E ICBM #2
  4. Kostroma 57°46’05”N 40°55’37”E ICBM #2
B. Major Air Bases
  1. Engels-2 51°28′52″N 046°12′38″E M-4 and the 3M
  2. Dolon (MB) aka Chagan and Semipalitinsk Dolon 50°32′N 079°11′0″E, Tu-95, Tu95, 3M and M-4 
  3. Ukrainka Air Base 51°10′12″N 128°26′42″E in 1955, Ukrainka was one of only six Soviet bases capable of handling the Myasishchev M-4 (NATO: Bison) bomber
  4. Belaya/Tserkov aka Bila Tserkva 49°47′46″N 30°01′28″E, heavy bomber base Tu-16 and later Tu-16N
  5. Soltsy Air Base 58°8′48″N 030°19′54″E
  6. Uzyn Air Base 49°47′25″N 30°26′27″E, Tu-95K stand-off missile carriers starting in 1959
  7. Siauliai Air Base 55°53′38″N 023°23′41″E, Staging for M-4 bombers that can reach US
  8. Tiski 71°41′51″N 128°54′10″E, Tu-95 staging base
  9. Tiski North 72°2′18″N 128°28′18″E, Tu-95 staging base
  10. Tiski West 71°41′36″N 128°41′0″E, Tu-95 staging base
  11. Ozerne (MB) 50°9′30″N 028°44′18″E, 15th Guard’s Heavy Bomber Division Tu-16
  12. Baranovichi (MB) 53°5′7″N 26°2′8″E (Belarus), Tu-16 base deployed Tu-16 bombers to Tiski and onward to ice station SP-6
  13. Belaya (MB) aka Srednii 52°54′54″N 103°34′30″E, Tu-4A, Tu-16, Tu-16K
  14. Aspidnoye (SB) aka Dresba-Krumaya 69°21′48″N 161°33′42″E, Arctic staging base for Tu-95 and Tu-16
  15. Dyagilevo (MB) 54°38′30″N 039°34′18″E M-4
  16. Lebedovo 51°17′0″N 046°15′0″E, dispersal site for bombers from Engels during high tension
  17. Leningrad Air Control Center 60°03’N 030°11’E
  18. Mengon (SB) 50°02’00” 136°18’00”E, dispersal base 
  19. Moscow/Bykovo Command and Control 55°37’N 38°03’E
  20. Mozdok 43°47′15″N 44°36′11″E, Tu-95 base
  21. Vozdvizhenka aka Ussuriysk 43°54′44″N 131°55′04″E, Pacific Long Range Bomber Fleet Tu-16
  22. Melitopol 46°52′36″N 035°18′27″E
  23. Pochinok 54°20′24″N 032°28′24″E
  24. Seshcha 53°43’N 033°21’E
  25. Ostrov/Gorokhovo 57°18′0″N 028°26′0″E, Tu-16K and Tu-16Z
  26. Soltsy Air Base 58°8′48″N 030°19′54″E, Tu-22
  27. Spassk-Dalny Airfield 44°36′47″N 132°53′13″E, Tu-16
  28. Tartu 58°24’N 026°46E
  29. Minsk-Machulische 53°46′25″N 027°34′38″E
  30. Bobruysk 53°6′17″N 29°12′21″E, threat to NATO allies
  31. Pryluky Air Base 50°34′0″N 032°19′0″E, Tu-16 medium bombers
  32. Poltava Air Base 49°37′37″N 034°29′11″E, Tu-16
  33. Zhitomir/Skomorokhi 50°10’N 028°44’E
  34. Poltava Air Base 49°37′37″N 034°29′11″E, Tu-16
  35. Bykhov 53°31’N 30°12’E, one 1959 target list
  36. Orsha/Orsha S.W. 54°26’N 30°17’E
  37. Gomel/Pribytki 52°18’N 031°10’E
This List concludes the list of air bases to be bombed. Keep in mind that there were fewer than 160 Soviet intercontinental two-way bombers. The following article may interest you concerning the Tu-16's range. The Soviets had over 950 Tu-16s available by 1962.
Richard D. English and Dan I. Bolef, “Defense against Bomber Attack,” Scientific American 229, no. 2 (August 1973), 11–19.

Quote from the above article:
It has been suggested, however, that the medium-range bombers could be used on one-way "suicide" missions against the U.S. Even assuming Russian willingness to sacrifice the planes and their crews, such missions seem unlikely. The Tu-22, under the best of conditions, has insufficient range for even a one-way trip. The Tu-16, if it were based at the tip of the Kola Peninsula in the northwestern U.S.S.R. or the Chukchi Peninsula in the northeastern U.S.S.R., and if it were flown at optimum speed and altitude, could perhaps reach some parts of the U.S. The bomber forces are not based on the Kola or Chukchi peninsulas, however, but farther inland, which increases the distance to their potential targets. Moreover, on combat missions evasive maneuvers necessary to avoid detection and interception would further reduce their range. For reasons such as these the International Institute for Strategic Studies has concluded that "Soviet [medium-range] bombers can strike at United States allies anywhere on the Eurasian landmass and also at Canada, but not at the United States itself." Similar views have been expressed by recent secretaries of defense, from Robert S. McNamara through Elliot L. Richardson.

A. Submarine and Naval Bases

Submarine and Naval Bases
​This is the end of Part III A. Pairing of weapons systems with targets will come in Part IV.

Final Note

​As the conflicts in the Middle East and the Ukraine continue, I am reminded of the basic nature of man as expounded by Caleb Young in the First Strike series during his home schooling. I wonder how long it will be before nuclear weapons are unleashed by those who do not share my same values in this regard.
Picture
get the books now
]]><![CDATA[Part III: Kennedy Contemplates Surprise Attack on Russia]]>Thu, 26 Oct 2023 07:00:00 GMThttps://www.thomasjyeggy.com/blog/kennedy-contemplates-surprise-attack-on-russia
Discover the shocking historical documents that shed light on President Kennedy's contemplation of a surprise attack on Russia during the Cold War. Delve into secret memos and discussions where JFK considered the feasibility of a first strike and its consequences. Uncover the intense strategic decisions of a turbulent era.

The Documents To Be Read

The Plan: An Alternative to SIOP-62, Dated 9-5-61
Summary: Prepared for General Maxwell Taylor, Dated 9-7-61
JFK’s Questions Prepared by Taylor for Lemnitzer, Dated 9-19-61, about Any Flexibility in SIOP-62 and the Feasibility of a Surprise Attack

  • It is clear from some of Kennedy's questions that he had considered the Kaysen-Rowen Plan.
  • “How would you plan an attack that would use a minimum sized force against Soviet long-range striking power only?”
  • “Would it be possible to achieve surprise with such a plan during a period of high tension?”
  • “Would not an alternative first strike plan, even if only partially successful when implemented, leave us in a better position than we would be in if we had to respond to an enemy first strike?”
  • “Is this idea of a first strike against the Soviets’ long-range striking power a feasible one?”
Memo on Kennedy Conference with Taylor-Lemnitzer-Power-Clifton, Dated 9-20-61

JFK Continues His Questions about a Surprise Attack on Russia, 9-21-61

At this meeting, attended by JCS Chairman Lemnitzer, General Maxwell Taylor, and others, President Kennedy ignored General Power’s rants about Soviet launch sites that had not yet been found and asked the other Administration officials and military staff present how much warning would the Soviet Union need before launching ICBMs and intercontinental bombers.

Meeting in the Cabinet Room, 10-10-61

At this meeting on October 10, 1961, the cabinet considered a document called “Preferred Sequence of Military Actions in a Berlin Conflict.” If conventional methods failed, the document called for selective nuclear attacks followed by limited tactical employment of nuclear weapons on the battlefield, followed finally by general nuclear war. Kennedy expressed doubt that a limited nuclear war could be fought without leading to strategic nuclear war. Paul Nitze agreed and stated that it would be best for us in moving toward the use of nuclear weapons to consider most seriously the option of an initial strategic strike of our own. McGeorge Bundy’s notes on the meeting indicated that Nitze felt we could in some real sense be victorious in the series of nuclear exchanges but we might well lose if we allowed the Soviets to strike first.

Draft Presidential Memorandum (DPM), October 28, 1961, Consequences of Thermonuclear War under Various Conditions of Outbreak

It is worth noting that the original Kaysen plan was modified by this date to involve the original penetration of the Soviet Union’s airspace by only ten B-52s that would be followed up by missiles and other aircraft. The modified plan, as laid out in the DPM (pages 2–4) was a follows:

I. U. S. Strikes First Against a Non-Alert Soviet Posture

In the first case, the U. S. launches an attack carefully designed to minimize warning to the Soviets. This is accomplished, in part, by restricting the number of vehicles used in the first wave of the attack to what is essential to the timely destruction of Soviet long-range nuclear capabilities. The attack begins with ten B-52’s, each carrying 4 bombs and 2 Hound Dog missiles, infiltrating undetected at night and at low altitude (500 feet) through holes in the Soviet radar coverage bound for the deep ICBM and bomber bases. Their first bomb drops are timed to occur immediately after the detonation of ICBM’s and Polaris missiles on these and other targets. There is an immediate U. S. follow-up attack using B-52’s, overseas based tactical aircraft, carrier aircraft, and overseas based (reflex) B-47’s. The ten infiltrating B-52’s, plus an additional 20 used in the immediate follow-up attack, could have been launched from a pre-existing Airborne Alert used to mask the launching of so many aircraft. The expected surviving Soviet long-range nuclear delivery force includes 2 or less ICBM’s, 30 MRBM’s, 3 heavy bombers, 45 medium bombers, and 5 submarine-launched missiles.

At this point, Krushchev is faced with a singularly difficult set of decisions. He must assume that U. S. follow-up attacks are on the way and that his small surviving force will soon be destroyed. If he launches his surviving force against U. S. military bases, he will do relatively little damage and have lost the war. If he launches this force against civilians in the West, he will do very substantial damage to Western Europe and much less to the United States. He will have lost the war and, in addition, he can count on the U. S. being in a mood for retribution. An offer by the U. S. to stop the war and seek a reasonable settlement with the USSR should, at this point, be both in our interest, and even more strongly in Kruschev’s [sic] interest, for it would be in our capability to completely destroy the Soviet Union.

Assume that he chooses maximum retaliation against cities. The damage that can be caused by the surviving Soviet force would be diminished by missile unreliability and, in the case of the bombers, by loss of tankers and staging bases, and by U. S. defenses. If the expected number of weapons reaching the United States happened to be assigned to the largest cities, and were to be delivered properly, the result might be 9 million mortalities. However, this would probably be cut in half by inefficiency in targeting (e.g. the surviving weapons happened to be targeted against smaller cities), and perhaps cut in half again by use of the available time before the arrival of bombers and submarines for evacuation of cities.

The surviving MRBM’s and medium and light bombers could deliver 45 bombs of about 2Mt each on Western Europe. If directed against population centers, there would be about 35 million mortalities, allowing for expected targeting inefficiency. In addition, there might be attacks by fighter-bombers and short range missiles.

These estimates are based on the assumption that a well designed and executed surprise attack is carried out according to plan. It is possible that we might be even more successful. However, there are many ways in which such an attack might fail to go according to plan. The Soviet Union may have ICBM’s that we do not know about, or we may have made other errors in our estimate of their forces. The Soviets might receive warning and alert and disperse their forces. For example, an unauthorized and unpredictable breach of radio silence might tip our hand. Or there may be unexpected field degradations in the performance of our weapon systems.

On the other hand, there are powerful advantages favoring the side that has the initiative. For example, warning signals that might alert the defender are almost always ambiguous and are unlikely to lead to decisive action. Moreover, the initial effect of the attack would probably be major disruption and disorganization. The temporary paralysis would improve the chances of the follow-up wave completing what the initial wave of the attack failed to accomplish. 
​
Nevertheless, the above considerations suggest that the implications of substantially less favorable circumstances must be examined.

How Would the Rowen-Kaysen Plan Have Been Executed?

The modified plan called for ten B-52s to utilize Terrain Avoidance Radar (TAR) and strike Designated Ground Zeroes (DGZs) in the Soviet Union. Some of the Designated Ground Zeroes were merely staging bases for Soviet planes that would have refueled there before taking off for the United States.Those forward bases could be hit by the second wave if necessary because planes escaped from the primaries.

The Terrain Avoidance Radar utilized by the B52s would allow them to fly at 500 feet, well below the 900 feet necessary for the Soviet P-15 low-altitude radar to detect them. The B-52s, in addition to the gravity bombs, were armed with two Hound Dog missiles that would have a range of at least 250 miles at 500 feet of altitude and a range of more than twice that at 55,000 feet. The Hound Dog missiles carried warheads ranging from 1–3 megatons in yield.

Although there haven't been any specific routes designated by Fred Kaplan (The Wizards of Armageddon), the routes can be extrapolated from the Chrome Dome Routes utilized by the SAC during the Cuban Missile Crisis. It is most likely that the planes would have come from several different directions because of the targets that would have been involved. Below are the main Soviet bases that would have been part of the Kaysen plan.  (See page 12 of​ https://nsarchive.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/1961-06-26a.pdf for "Nuclear threats to the US", listing 148 targets.) As explained by Kaysen in his plan he had reduced that list to 62 targets and the final DPM plan would reduce that to below 30.There are good reasons for the DPM plan reducing the initial attack to ten B-52s.

​It is unlikely that the Soviets would have sounded a full alert even if central command received a report of a low flying B-52 incursion without more evidence of a substantial attack. Moreover, at no time during the Berlin ’61 crisis did the Soviets raise their alert level, which was extremely low by SAC standards. Fred Kaplan in his 1983 book The Wizards of Armageddon (page 295) states:

The intelligence analysis disclosed that the Soviet strategic forces were in awful shape. The ICBMs and IRBMs were not loaded with warheads, and it would take at least six hours to get them loaded. None of their bombers were on any sort of alert. Almost all of their nuclear missile submarines were in port, and those at sea had to surface before launching. Moreover, the Soviet early warning network was riddled with gaps that would make it very difficult to detect a less than massive US bomber attack, especially if the bombers flew in at low altitudes.
​
Kaplan notes the secrecy and detail of the operational plan (page 299):

"Only five names appeared on the memorandum: Kennedy, McNamara, Maxwell Taylor, McGeorge Bundy, and Carl Kaysen. It was highly detailed, down to specifying the altitudes and general flight tactics of the attacking bombers. It concluded that a counterforce first strike was indeed very feasible, that we could pull it off with high confidence."

Kaplan followed up his 1981 book with an article in The Atlantic in 2001 and in that article it was reiterated, “It [Kaysen plan] spelled out what flight paths the US bomber should take, at what altitudes they should fly, and which targets they should hit with how many of what kinds of nuclear bombs. And it concluded that the mission was feasible-that there was a fair probability of success”
​
Despite efforts by many public agencies, the details specified by Kaplan have never been found in any documents produced by the government. However, I believe that through an examination of the Soviet bases that should have been targeted at that time, and through the various routes flown by B-52s during alert operations we can determine approximate time and routes to targets. Keep in mind that B-47s and A-4D aircraft were also able to fly under the radar. This means that B-47 bases in Spain and aircraft from carriers in the 2nd and 6th fleet would also be available, as well as A-1 and A-2 missiles from Polaris subs.

Soviet Bases 156 Possible Targets

Soviet Base
Location
Afrikanda
67°27′24″N 032°47′12″E
Alakurtti
66°58′24″N 030°20′42″E
Alekseyevskoye ​
49°17’N 14°06’E
Amoerma
69°45’N 61°40’E
Anadyr/Leninka
64°44′6″N 177°44′30″E, NE Arctic SB
Anadyr/Mys Nizeny
64°48.1'N 177°35.2' E
​(64.8017 N,177.5867E) Arctic SB
Arkhangelsk
64°26’N 40°23’E
*see also: Lakhta I Naval bases 64°23′0″N 40°43′0″E, Tu-16 base)
*see also:  Arkhangelsk/Yagoon: 64°24’N 40°54’E
Artem
43°24’N 132°10’E
Aspidnoye(SB) aka Dresba-Krumaya
69°21′48″N 161°33′42″E – Arctic staging base for Tu-95 and Tu-16
Bada-N
51°24′N 109°54′E​
Balaklava Crimea
44°29′56″N 33°35′46″E, Submarine pen deeply fortified needs Mt or more
Baltiysk Naval Base
54°39'16.38"N 19°54'33.44"E
​Baranovichi (MB)
53°5′7″N 26°2′8″E (Belarus) Tu-16 base deployed Tu-16 bombers to Tiski and onward to ice station SP-6
Belaya (MB) aka Srednii​
52°54′54″N 103°34′30″E, Tu-4A, Tu-16, Tu-16K
Belaya/Tserkov aka Bila Tserkva
​49°47′46″N 30°01′28″E, heavy bomber base Tu-16 and later Tu-16N
Belmorsk
64°31’N 34°46’E, submarine base
Berezovka (SB)
67°22′48″N 034°13′0″E
Bila Tserkva (MB)
49°47′46″N 30°01′28″E, Tu-16
Bobruysk
53°6′17″N 29°12′21″E, threat to NATO allies
Borispol-Kiev Ukraine
50°20′41″N 30°53′36″E
Brieg, Poland
50°51’N 017°25’E
Briyeni
45°58’N 029°23’E
Bykhov
​53°31’N 30°12’E, on 1959 target list
Chekurovka (SB)
71°3′54″N 127°20′18″E,Tu-16 
Chepelevka
49°47’N 030°25’E
Chernigovka
44°19’N 132°33’E
Chernyakhovsk
54°37’N 021°49’E
Chokurdakh
70°32’N 147°45’E
Dallyar
40°53’N 045°57’E
Debrecen, Hung
47°30’N 021°38’E
Dikson
73°30’N 080°24’E
Dolinsk
47°15’N 142°46’E
Dolon (MB) aka Chagan &Semipalitinsk Dolon
50°32′N 079°11′0″E, Tu-95,Tu95 3M & M-4 
Dyagilevo (MB)
54°38′30″N 039°34′18″E M-4
Engels-2
​51°28′52″N 046°12′38″E, M-4 and the 3M became 1230th Aviation Regiment Air Refueling
Gadzhiyevo aka Yagelnaya Guba
69.258878° 33.335251°, located on the eastern shore of Guba Sayda (Sayda Bay), Murmanskaya Oblast Naval Base Northern Fleet
Gdov
58°46’N 027°48’E
Gomel/Pribytki
52°18’N 031°10’E
Gross Dolln, E Ger
53°02’N 013°33’E
Hara Harbor and Submarine Base
59°35'19''N 25°36'49''E
Horokhiv EG*
*
Ivanovo Severny (MB)
​57°3′30″N 040°58′54″E, Tu-4A
Kalinin
56°50’N 035°45’E
Kaliningrad/Guryevsk
54°47’N 020°37’E
Kaliningrad/Zeyerappen
54°45’N 020°17’E
Kami Shikuka
49°17’N 142°36’E
Kapustin Yar
​48°59’N 45°72’E
Karosta-Leipaja (Submarines)
56°33′0″N 21°0′20″E, Baltic Fleets 14th Submarine squadron
Kedainiai
55°19’N 023°57’E
Kerch/Bagerovo
45°24’N 036°16’E
Keton
49°44’N 142°52’E
Khorol E.
44°27’N 132°08’E
Kirovograd/Kanatovo
48°34’N 032°23’E
Kola
68°51’N 033°01’E
Kolomyya
48°32’N 025°08’E
Kostroma
57°46’05”N 40°55’37”E ICBM
Krechevitsy
58°37’N 031°23’E
Kronstadt Naval Base
59°59′27″N, 29°46′29″E
Lebedovo
51°17′0″N 046°15′0″E, dispersal site for bombers from Engels during high tension
Leningrad Air Control Center
60°03’N 030°11’E
Lenino (MB)
​52°54′36″N 156°52′42″E, Tu-16
Lukhovitsy
54°54’N 039°01’E
Machulishchy (MB)
53°46′25″N 027°34′38″E, Tu-22
Malaya Lopatka-Bolshaya Lopatka
69°26'12"N 32°25'30"E, only 2 miles apart –main sub base
Markovo
64°41’N 170°26’E
Melitopol
46°52′36″N 035°18′27″E
Mengon (SB)
50°02’00” 136°18’00”E, dispersal base
Minsk-Machulische
53°46′25″N 027°34′38″E
Mirogord
49°56’N 33°39’E
Modlin, Poland
52°27’N 20°40’E
Monchegorsk (FB) Fighter Base
67°59’12”N 033°01’06”E
Moscow/Bykovo-Command and Control
55°37’N 38°03’E
Mozdok
43°47′15″N 44°36′11″E, Tu-95 base
Mozdok E.
43°43’N 044°54’E
Murmansk N.E.
69°01’N 33°18’E
Murmansk/Vayenga
69°02’N 33°25’E
Murmashi
68°49’N 32°48’E
Mys Shmidta(SB)
​68°52′06″N 179°22′32″W, Arctic staging base for Tu-16 & Tu-22
Nagurskoye (SB)
80°47′55″N 047°28′47″E, Arctic staging base (northernmost Russian base)
Nerpichya Naval Base
69°27’00” 32°22’00”E
Nikolayevka
43°05’N 133°12’E
Nizhniye Kresty
68°45’N 161°21’E
Nizhyn
51°6′0″N 031°52′0″E, Tu-16 & Tu-22
Novorossiyskoye
43°21’N 132°35’E
Okhotsk
59°25’N 143°02’E
Olenya (SB) -near Skalisty less than 2 miles NE
68°09′06″N 033°28′12″E, Tu-22 first detected in 1957 and served as forward staging base; many SAM sites in this area, also Naval base
Olonets/Nurmalitsy
61°03’N 32°59’E
Oranienburg, E.G.
52°44’N 13°13’E
Orsha S.W.
54°26’N 30°17’E
Osh Air Base
40°36′32″N 072°47′35″E
Osinovka
44°01’N 132°13’E
Ostrov Bolshevik (SB)
78°35′6″N 100°59′42″E
Ostrov/Gorokhovo
​57°18′0″N 028°26′0″E, Tu-16K & Tu-16Z
Ostrovnoy (Gremikha-Yokanga)
68°03′N 39°30′E, main service base for nuclear subs
Ozerne (MB)
50°9′30″N 028°44′18″E, 15th Guard’s Heavy Bomber Division Tu-16
Ozero Kulpyavr
69°06’N 032°24’E
Paldiski/Vasalemma
59°16’N 024°13’E
Panevezys
55°44’N 024°28’E
Parnu
58°24’N 024°29’E
Pechenga
69°24’N 031°00’E
Petrozavodsk N.W.
61°53’N 034°09’E
Plesetsk Cosmodrome
​62°55′32″N 40°34′40″E ICBM
Pochinok
54°20’N 032°29’E
Poltava Air Base
​49°37′37″N 034°29′11″E, Tu-16
Polyarnyy
69°12’N 33°28’E
Powidz, PCL
52°23’N 017°50’E
Provideniya/Urelik
64°24’N 173°13’W
Pryluky Air Base
50°34′0″N 032°19′0″E, Tu-16 medium bombers
Pushkin
59°41’N 030°21’E
Raadi Air Field
58°24′17″N 026°46′25″E, Tu-16
Ramenskoye
55°34’N 038°08’E
Rogachevo Air Base (SB)
71°37′0″N 052°28′42″E
Romanovka
43°15’N 132°27’E
Romanovka W.
43°14’N 132°19’E
Saki
45°05’N 033°36’E
Samtredia E.
42°11’N 042°28’E
Sarasuz
45°07’N 033°59’E
Semipalatinsk
50°21’N 080°17’E
Seshcha
53°43’N 033°21’E
Severomorsk
69.0690°N, 33.4082°E, Northern Fleet home base
Severomorsk-2
69°0′54″N 033°17′30″E Tu-16
Severomorsk-3
68°52′0″N 033°43′0″E Tu-16
Seymchan
62°53’N 152°25’E
Siauliai Air Base
​55°53′38″N 023°23′41″E, Staging for M-4 bombers that can reach US
Siversky Air Base
​59°21′24″N 030°2′12″E, fighter base
Soltsy Air Base
58°8′48″N 030°19′54″E, Tu-22 
Spassk-Dalny Airfield
44°36′47″N 132°53′13″E Tu-16
Stanislav
48°54’N 024°42’E
Starokonstantinov
49°45’N 027°16’E
Stryy N.E.
49°15’N 023°58’E
Tambov
52°42’N 041°22’E
Tanyurer
64°51’N 174°13’E
Tartu
58°24’N 026°46E
Tbilisi/Vaziani
41°38’N 045°02’E
Tiski
​71°41′51″N 128°54′10″E, Tu-95 staging base
Tiski North
72°2′18″N 128°28′18″E, Tu-95 staging base
Tiski West
​71°41′36″N 128°41′0″E, Tu-95 staging base
Tyuratam-Bakinor
​45°39’N 63°18’50”E ICBM 4 launch sites
Ugolny Airbase
64°44′6″N 177°44′30″E, Tu-95 staging base
Ukrainka Air Base
​51°10′12″N 128°26′42″E, in 1955 Ukrainka was one of only six Soviet bases capable of handling the Myasishchev M-4 (NATO: Bison) bomber
Ulan-Ude Vostochny
51°51.0'N 107°44.1'E (51.8500, 107.7350) staging base 
Ura Bay Naval Base
69°19′N 32°48′E, and Ara Bay
Uzyn Air Base
​49°47′25″N 30°26′27″E,Tu-95K stand-off missile carriers starting in 1959
Verkhnyaya Salda
58°02’44”N 60°33’12”E ICBM
Vidyayevo, aka Ura Bay, Northern Fleet Naval Base
69°19′N 32°48′E, diesel-powered subs 
Vorkuta Sovetsky (SB)
67°27′56″N 064°18′28″E, maintained by OGA (Arctic Control Group, one of the largest runways in Arctic region)
Vozdvizhenka, aka Ussuriysk
43°54′44″N 131°55′04″E, Pacific Long Range Bomber Fleet Tu-16
Welzow E. Ger
52°08'00"N 013°09'00"E
Werneuchen
52°37’54”N 013°46’09”E
Yoshkar-Ola
62°55’32”N 40°34’40”E
YurYa
​59°02’N 49°16’E ICBM
Zapadnaya Lista
​69°25’N 32°26’E, nuclear sub base 
Zaporozhye E.
47°52’N 035°19’E
Zavitinsk
50°11′30″N 129°30′12″E
Zelts E.
46°38’N 030°06’E
Zhitomir/Skomorokhi
50°10’N 028°44’E
Zyabrovka
​52°18′22.0″N 31°9′44.1″E, Tu-16R, Tu-16
Soviet Bases 156 Possible Targets
End Part III
Picture
get the books now
]]><![CDATA[Mushroom Cloud Wins Literary Titan Book Award]]>Sun, 08 Oct 2023 15:17:38 GMThttps://www.thomasjyeggy.com/blog/literary-titan-book-award-winner

Embracing Literary Excellence

In the realm of literary achievements, there are milestones that echo beyond the pages of books and reach into the core of societal consciousness. Such a momentous occasion has graced us with the exceptional novel "Mushroom Cloud," penned by a masterful storyteller. This gripping narrative has not only captivated readers but has also garnered the prestigious Literary Titan Book Award, an accolade that recognizes outstanding literary works. Let's delve into the heart of Mushroom Cloud and its relevance in the context of this remarkable achievement.
Picture

Exploring Dr. Caleb Young's Ethical Odyssey

Mushroom Cloud takes us on a compelling journey through the intricate web of espionage, moral dilemmas, and the dire consequences of nuclear warfare. At its core, the book explores the ethical struggles faced by Dr. Caleb Young, a brilliant physicist and CIA's chief science officer. His unwavering commitment to preventing a catastrophic global conflict, despite overwhelming odds, forms the crux of the story.

A Relevant Tale in Today's World

The book's thematic depth resonates profoundly with the contemporary world, where geopolitical tensions and the specter of nuclear threats continue to cast shadows. Against this backdrop, the Literary Titan Book Award serves as a testament to the novel's ability to engage readers intellectually and emotionally, sparking vital conversations about the delicate balance between power, morality, and the pursuit of peace

Historical Parallels: The Cuban Missile Crisis

What sets Mushroom Cloud apart is its meticulous portrayal of historical events, notably the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Dr. Young's struggles mirror the real-life dilemmas faced by individuals in positions of power during that tumultuous period. The book offers readers a glimpse into the inner workings of political and military machinery, highlighting the grave consequences of hasty decisions and the importance of moral conviction in the face of adversity.

The Literary Titan Book Award: A Mark of Distinction

Receiving the Literary Titan Book Award elevates Mushroom Cloud to a pedestal of literary excellence. It underscores the novel's ability to intertwine gripping storytelling with profound philosophical questions, challenging readers to confront the complexities of human nature and the choices we make in the pursuit of a better world.

A Timeless Reminder and Inspiration

Moreover, this recognition illuminates the enduring relevance of historical fiction in shaping our understanding of the present and the future. Mushroom Cloud serves as a poignant reminder of the importance of learning from the past, urging us to reflect on the consequences of unchecked power and the significance of individuals who dare to defy the status quo for the greater good.

Conclusion: Celebrating Literary Brilliance and Impact

In conclusion, the Literary Titan Book Award bestowed upon Mushroom Cloud is not merely a celebration of a literary triumph; it is a celebration of the power of words to inspire change, evoke empathy, and ignite intellectual discourse. As readers, let us immerse ourselves in this extraordinary narrative, embracing the profound lessons it imparts and acknowledging the brilliance of its creator. Cheers to Mushroom Cloud and its well-deserved place among the literary stars!
Picture
get the books now
]]>