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THOMAS J. YEGGY
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​My Thoughts on Current Events
AKA My Blog

Part III: Kennedy Contemplates Surprise Attack on Russia

10/26/2023

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Kennedy Contemplates Surprise Attack on Russia
Discover the shocking historical documents that shed light on President Kennedy's contemplation of a surprise attack on Russia during the Cold War. Delve into secret memos and discussions where JFK considered the feasibility of a first strike and its consequences. Uncover the intense strategic decisions of a turbulent era.

The Documents To Be Read

The Plan: An Alternative to SIOP-62, Dated 9-5-61
Summary: Prepared for General Maxwell Taylor, Dated 9-7-61
JFK’s Questions Prepared by Taylor for Lemnitzer, Dated 9-19-61, about Any Flexibility in SIOP-62 and the Feasibility of a Surprise Attack

  • It is clear from some of Kennedy's questions that he had considered the Kaysen-Rowen Plan.
  • “How would you plan an attack that would use a minimum sized force against Soviet long-range striking power only?”
  • “Would it be possible to achieve surprise with such a plan during a period of high tension?”
  • “Would not an alternative first strike plan, even if only partially successful when implemented, leave us in a better position than we would be in if we had to respond to an enemy first strike?”
  • “Is this idea of a first strike against the Soviets’ long-range striking power a feasible one?”
Memo on Kennedy Conference with Taylor-Lemnitzer-Power-Clifton, Dated 9-20-61

JFK Continues His Questions about a Surprise Attack on Russia, 9-21-61

At this meeting, attended by JCS Chairman Lemnitzer, General Maxwell Taylor, and others, President Kennedy ignored General Power’s rants about Soviet launch sites that had not yet been found and asked the other Administration officials and military staff present how much warning would the Soviet Union need before launching ICBMs and intercontinental bombers.

Meeting in the Cabinet Room, 10-10-61

At this meeting on October 10, 1961, the cabinet considered a document called “Preferred Sequence of Military Actions in a Berlin Conflict.” If conventional methods failed, the document called for selective nuclear attacks followed by limited tactical employment of nuclear weapons on the battlefield, followed finally by general nuclear war. Kennedy expressed doubt that a limited nuclear war could be fought without leading to strategic nuclear war. Paul Nitze agreed and stated that it would be best for us in moving toward the use of nuclear weapons to consider most seriously the option of an initial strategic strike of our own. McGeorge Bundy’s notes on the meeting indicated that Nitze felt we could in some real sense be victorious in the series of nuclear exchanges but we might well lose if we allowed the Soviets to strike first.

Draft Presidential Memorandum (DPM), October 28, 1961, Consequences of Thermonuclear War under Various Conditions of Outbreak

It is worth noting that the original Kaysen plan was modified by this date to involve the original penetration of the Soviet Union’s airspace by only ten B-52s that would be followed up by missiles and other aircraft. The modified plan, as laid out in the DPM (pages 2–4) was a follows:

I. U. S. Strikes First Against a Non-Alert Soviet Posture

In the first case, the U. S. launches an attack carefully designed to minimize warning to the Soviets. This is accomplished, in part, by restricting the number of vehicles used in the first wave of the attack to what is essential to the timely destruction of Soviet long-range nuclear capabilities. The attack begins with ten B-52’s, each carrying 4 bombs and 2 Hound Dog missiles, infiltrating undetected at night and at low altitude (500 feet) through holes in the Soviet radar coverage bound for the deep ICBM and bomber bases. Their first bomb drops are timed to occur immediately after the detonation of ICBM’s and Polaris missiles on these and other targets. There is an immediate U. S. follow-up attack using B-52’s, overseas based tactical aircraft, carrier aircraft, and overseas based (reflex) B-47’s. The ten infiltrating B-52’s, plus an additional 20 used in the immediate follow-up attack, could have been launched from a pre-existing Airborne Alert used to mask the launching of so many aircraft. The expected surviving Soviet long-range nuclear delivery force includes 2 or less ICBM’s, 30 MRBM’s, 3 heavy bombers, 45 medium bombers, and 5 submarine-launched missiles.

At this point, Krushchev is faced with a singularly difficult set of decisions. He must assume that U. S. follow-up attacks are on the way and that his small surviving force will soon be destroyed. If he launches his surviving force against U. S. military bases, he will do relatively little damage and have lost the war. If he launches this force against civilians in the West, he will do very substantial damage to Western Europe and much less to the United States. He will have lost the war and, in addition, he can count on the U. S. being in a mood for retribution. An offer by the U. S. to stop the war and seek a reasonable settlement with the USSR should, at this point, be both in our interest, and even more strongly in Kruschev’s [sic] interest, for it would be in our capability to completely destroy the Soviet Union.

Assume that he chooses maximum retaliation against cities. The damage that can be caused by the surviving Soviet force would be diminished by missile unreliability and, in the case of the bombers, by loss of tankers and staging bases, and by U. S. defenses. If the expected number of weapons reaching the United States happened to be assigned to the largest cities, and were to be delivered properly, the result might be 9 million mortalities. However, this would probably be cut in half by inefficiency in targeting (e.g. the surviving weapons happened to be targeted against smaller cities), and perhaps cut in half again by use of the available time before the arrival of bombers and submarines for evacuation of cities.

The surviving MRBM’s and medium and light bombers could deliver 45 bombs of about 2Mt each on Western Europe. If directed against population centers, there would be about 35 million mortalities, allowing for expected targeting inefficiency. In addition, there might be attacks by fighter-bombers and short range missiles.

These estimates are based on the assumption that a well designed and executed surprise attack is carried out according to plan. It is possible that we might be even more successful. However, there are many ways in which such an attack might fail to go according to plan. The Soviet Union may have ICBM’s that we do not know about, or we may have made other errors in our estimate of their forces. The Soviets might receive warning and alert and disperse their forces. For example, an unauthorized and unpredictable breach of radio silence might tip our hand. Or there may be unexpected field degradations in the performance of our weapon systems.

On the other hand, there are powerful advantages favoring the side that has the initiative. For example, warning signals that might alert the defender are almost always ambiguous and are unlikely to lead to decisive action. Moreover, the initial effect of the attack would probably be major disruption and disorganization. The temporary paralysis would improve the chances of the follow-up wave completing what the initial wave of the attack failed to accomplish. 
​
Nevertheless, the above considerations suggest that the implications of substantially less favorable circumstances must be examined.

How Would the Rowen-Kaysen Plan Have Been Executed?

The modified plan called for ten B-52s to utilize Terrain Avoidance Radar (TAR) and strike Designated Ground Zeroes (DGZs) in the Soviet Union. Some of the Designated Ground Zeroes were merely staging bases for Soviet planes that would have refueled there before taking off for the United States.Those forward bases could be hit by the second wave if necessary because planes escaped from the primaries.

The Terrain Avoidance Radar utilized by the B52s would allow them to fly at 500 feet, well below the 900 feet necessary for the Soviet P-15 low-altitude radar to detect them. The B-52s, in addition to the gravity bombs, were armed with two Hound Dog missiles that would have a range of at least 250 miles at 500 feet of altitude and a range of more than twice that at 55,000 feet. The Hound Dog missiles carried warheads ranging from 1–3 megatons in yield.

Although there haven't been any specific routes designated by Fred Kaplan (The Wizards of Armageddon), the routes can be extrapolated from the Chrome Dome Routes utilized by the SAC during the Cuban Missile Crisis. It is most likely that the planes would have come from several different directions because of the targets that would have been involved. Below are the main Soviet bases that would have been part of the Kaysen plan.  (See page 12 of​ https://nsarchive.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/1961-06-26a.pdf for "Nuclear threats to the US", listing 148 targets.) As explained by Kaysen in his plan he had reduced that list to 62 targets and the final DPM plan would reduce that to below 30.There are good reasons for the DPM plan reducing the initial attack to ten B-52s.

​It is unlikely that the Soviets would have sounded a full alert even if central command received a report of a low flying B-52 incursion without more evidence of a substantial attack. Moreover, at no time during the Berlin ’61 crisis did the Soviets raise their alert level, which was extremely low by SAC standards. Fred Kaplan in his 1983 book The Wizards of Armageddon (page 295) states:

The intelligence analysis disclosed that the Soviet strategic forces were in awful shape. The ICBMs and IRBMs were not loaded with warheads, and it would take at least six hours to get them loaded. None of their bombers were on any sort of alert. Almost all of their nuclear missile submarines were in port, and those at sea had to surface before launching. Moreover, the Soviet early warning network was riddled with gaps that would make it very difficult to detect a less than massive US bomber attack, especially if the bombers flew in at low altitudes.
​
Kaplan notes the secrecy and detail of the operational plan (page 299):

"Only five names appeared on the memorandum: Kennedy, McNamara, Maxwell Taylor, McGeorge Bundy, and Carl Kaysen. It was highly detailed, down to specifying the altitudes and general flight tactics of the attacking bombers. It concluded that a counterforce first strike was indeed very feasible, that we could pull it off with high confidence."

Kaplan followed up his 1981 book with an article in The Atlantic in 2001 and in that article it was reiterated, “It [Kaysen plan] spelled out what flight paths the US bomber should take, at what altitudes they should fly, and which targets they should hit with how many of what kinds of nuclear bombs. And it concluded that the mission was feasible-that there was a fair probability of success”
​
Despite efforts by many public agencies, the details specified by Kaplan have never been found in any documents produced by the government. However, I believe that through an examination of the Soviet bases that should have been targeted at that time, and through the various routes flown by B-52s during alert operations we can determine approximate time and routes to targets. Keep in mind that B-47s and A-4D aircraft were also able to fly under the radar. This means that B-47 bases in Spain and aircraft from carriers in the 2nd and 6th fleet would also be available, as well as A-1 and A-2 missiles from Polaris subs.
Picture
Picture

Soviet Bases 156 Possible Targets

Soviet Base
Location
Afrikanda
67°27′24″N 032°47′12″E
Alakurtti
66°58′24″N 030°20′42″E
Alekseyevskoye ​
49°17’N 14°06’E
Amoerma
69°45’N 61°40’E
Anadyr/Leninka
64°44′6″N 177°44′30″E, NE Arctic SB
Anadyr/Mys Nizeny
64°48.1'N 177°35.2' E
​(64.8017 N,177.5867E) Arctic SB
Arkhangelsk
64°26’N 40°23’E
*see also: Lakhta I Naval bases 64°23′0″N 40°43′0″E, Tu-16 base)
*see also:  Arkhangelsk/Yagoon: 64°24’N 40°54’E
Artem
43°24’N 132°10’E
Aspidnoye(SB) aka Dresba-Krumaya
69°21′48″N 161°33′42″E – Arctic staging base for Tu-95 and Tu-16
Bada-N
51°24′N 109°54′E​
Balaklava Crimea
44°29′56″N 33°35′46″E, Submarine pen deeply fortified needs Mt or more
Baltiysk Naval Base
54°39'16.38"N 19°54'33.44"E
​Baranovichi (MB)
53°5′7″N 26°2′8″E (Belarus) Tu-16 base deployed Tu-16 bombers to Tiski and onward to ice station SP-6
Belaya (MB) aka Srednii​
52°54′54″N 103°34′30″E, Tu-4A, Tu-16, Tu-16K
Belaya/Tserkov aka Bila Tserkva
​49°47′46″N 30°01′28″E, heavy bomber base Tu-16 and later Tu-16N
Belmorsk
64°31’N 34°46’E, submarine base
Berezovka (SB)
67°22′48″N 034°13′0″E
Bila Tserkva (MB)
49°47′46″N 30°01′28″E, Tu-16
Bobruysk
53°6′17″N 29°12′21″E, threat to NATO allies
Borispol-Kiev Ukraine
50°20′41″N 30°53′36″E
Brieg, Poland
50°51’N 017°25’E
Briyeni
45°58’N 029°23’E
Bykhov
​53°31’N 30°12’E, on 1959 target list
Chekurovka (SB)
71°3′54″N 127°20′18″E,Tu-16 
Chepelevka
49°47’N 030°25’E
Chernigovka
44°19’N 132°33’E
Chernyakhovsk
54°37’N 021°49’E
Chokurdakh
70°32’N 147°45’E
Dallyar
40°53’N 045°57’E
Debrecen, Hung
47°30’N 021°38’E
Dikson
73°30’N 080°24’E
Dolinsk
47°15’N 142°46’E
Dolon (MB) aka Chagan &Semipalitinsk Dolon
50°32′N 079°11′0″E, Tu-95,Tu95 3M & M-4 
Dyagilevo (MB)
54°38′30″N 039°34′18″E M-4
Engels-2
​51°28′52″N 046°12′38″E, M-4 and the 3M became 1230th Aviation Regiment Air Refueling
Gadzhiyevo aka Yagelnaya Guba
69.258878° 33.335251°, located on the eastern shore of Guba Sayda (Sayda Bay), Murmanskaya Oblast Naval Base Northern Fleet
Gdov
58°46’N 027°48’E
Gomel/Pribytki
52°18’N 031°10’E
Gross Dolln, E Ger
53°02’N 013°33’E
Hara Harbor and Submarine Base
59°35'19''N 25°36'49''E
Horokhiv EG*
*
Ivanovo Severny (MB)
​57°3′30″N 040°58′54″E, Tu-4A
Kalinin
56°50’N 035°45’E
Kaliningrad/Guryevsk
54°47’N 020°37’E
Kaliningrad/Zeyerappen
54°45’N 020°17’E
Kami Shikuka
49°17’N 142°36’E
Kapustin Yar
​48°59’N 45°72’E
Karosta-Leipaja (Submarines)
56°33′0″N 21°0′20″E, Baltic Fleets 14th Submarine squadron
Kedainiai
55°19’N 023°57’E
Kerch/Bagerovo
45°24’N 036°16’E
Keton
49°44’N 142°52’E
Khorol E.
44°27’N 132°08’E
Kirovograd/Kanatovo
48°34’N 032°23’E
Kola
68°51’N 033°01’E
Kolomyya
48°32’N 025°08’E
Kostroma
57°46’05”N 40°55’37”E ICBM
Krechevitsy
58°37’N 031°23’E
Kronstadt Naval Base
59°59′27″N, 29°46′29″E
Lebedovo
51°17′0″N 046°15′0″E, dispersal site for bombers from Engels during high tension
Leningrad Air Control Center
60°03’N 030°11’E
Lenino (MB)
​52°54′36″N 156°52′42″E, Tu-16
Lukhovitsy
54°54’N 039°01’E
Machulishchy (MB)
53°46′25″N 027°34′38″E, Tu-22
Malaya Lopatka-Bolshaya Lopatka
69°26'12"N 32°25'30"E, only 2 miles apart –main sub base
Markovo
64°41’N 170°26’E
Melitopol
46°52′36″N 035°18′27″E
Mengon (SB)
50°02’00” 136°18’00”E, dispersal base
Minsk-Machulische
53°46′25″N 027°34′38″E
Mirogord
49°56’N 33°39’E
Modlin, Poland
52°27’N 20°40’E
Monchegorsk (FB) Fighter Base
67°59’12”N 033°01’06”E
Moscow/Bykovo-Command and Control
55°37’N 38°03’E
Mozdok
43°47′15″N 44°36′11″E, Tu-95 base
Mozdok E.
43°43’N 044°54’E
Murmansk N.E.
69°01’N 33°18’E
Murmansk/Vayenga
69°02’N 33°25’E
Murmashi
68°49’N 32°48’E
Mys Shmidta(SB)
​68°52′06″N 179°22′32″W, Arctic staging base for Tu-16 & Tu-22
Nagurskoye (SB)
80°47′55″N 047°28′47″E, Arctic staging base (northernmost Russian base)
Nerpichya Naval Base
69°27’00” 32°22’00”E
Nikolayevka
43°05’N 133°12’E
Nizhniye Kresty
68°45’N 161°21’E
Nizhyn
51°6′0″N 031°52′0″E, Tu-16 & Tu-22
Novorossiyskoye
43°21’N 132°35’E
Okhotsk
59°25’N 143°02’E
Olenya (SB) -near Skalisty less than 2 miles NE
68°09′06″N 033°28′12″E, Tu-22 first detected in 1957 and served as forward staging base; many SAM sites in this area, also Naval base
Olonets/Nurmalitsy
61°03’N 32°59’E
Oranienburg, E.G.
52°44’N 13°13’E
Orsha S.W.
54°26’N 30°17’E
Osh Air Base
40°36′32″N 072°47′35″E
Osinovka
44°01’N 132°13’E
Ostrov Bolshevik (SB)
78°35′6″N 100°59′42″E
Ostrov/Gorokhovo
​57°18′0″N 028°26′0″E, Tu-16K & Tu-16Z
Ostrovnoy (Gremikha-Yokanga)
68°03′N 39°30′E, main service base for nuclear subs
Ozerne (MB)
50°9′30″N 028°44′18″E, 15th Guard’s Heavy Bomber Division Tu-16
Ozero Kulpyavr
69°06’N 032°24’E
Paldiski/Vasalemma
59°16’N 024°13’E
Panevezys
55°44’N 024°28’E
Parnu
58°24’N 024°29’E
Pechenga
69°24’N 031°00’E
Petrozavodsk N.W.
61°53’N 034°09’E
Plesetsk Cosmodrome
​62°55′32″N 40°34′40″E ICBM
Pochinok
54°20’N 032°29’E
Poltava Air Base
​49°37′37″N 034°29′11″E, Tu-16
Polyarnyy
69°12’N 33°28’E
Powidz, PCL
52°23’N 017°50’E
Provideniya/Urelik
64°24’N 173°13’W
Pryluky Air Base
50°34′0″N 032°19′0″E, Tu-16 medium bombers
Pushkin
59°41’N 030°21’E
Raadi Air Field
58°24′17″N 026°46′25″E, Tu-16
Ramenskoye
55°34’N 038°08’E
Rogachevo Air Base (SB)
71°37′0″N 052°28′42″E
Romanovka
43°15’N 132°27’E
Romanovka W.
43°14’N 132°19’E
Saki
45°05’N 033°36’E
Samtredia E.
42°11’N 042°28’E
Sarasuz
45°07’N 033°59’E
Semipalatinsk
50°21’N 080°17’E
Seshcha
53°43’N 033°21’E
Severomorsk
69.0690°N, 33.4082°E, Northern Fleet home base
Severomorsk-2
69°0′54″N 033°17′30″E Tu-16
Severomorsk-3
68°52′0″N 033°43′0″E Tu-16
Seymchan
62°53’N 152°25’E
Siauliai Air Base
​55°53′38″N 023°23′41″E, Staging for M-4 bombers that can reach US
Siversky Air Base
​59°21′24″N 030°2′12″E, fighter base
Soltsy Air Base
58°8′48″N 030°19′54″E, Tu-22 
Spassk-Dalny Airfield
44°36′47″N 132°53′13″E Tu-16
Stanislav
48°54’N 024°42’E
Starokonstantinov
49°45’N 027°16’E
Stryy N.E.
49°15’N 023°58’E
Tambov
52°42’N 041°22’E
Tanyurer
64°51’N 174°13’E
Tartu
58°24’N 026°46E
Tbilisi/Vaziani
41°38’N 045°02’E
Tiski
​71°41′51″N 128°54′10″E, Tu-95 staging base
Tiski North
72°2′18″N 128°28′18″E, Tu-95 staging base
Tiski West
​71°41′36″N 128°41′0″E, Tu-95 staging base
Tyuratam-Bakinor
​45°39’N 63°18’50”E ICBM 4 launch sites
Ugolny Airbase
64°44′6″N 177°44′30″E, Tu-95 staging base
Ukrainka Air Base
​51°10′12″N 128°26′42″E, in 1955 Ukrainka was one of only six Soviet bases capable of handling the Myasishchev M-4 (NATO: Bison) bomber
Ulan-Ude Vostochny
51°51.0'N 107°44.1'E (51.8500, 107.7350) staging base 
Ura Bay Naval Base
69°19′N 32°48′E, and Ara Bay
Uzyn Air Base
​49°47′25″N 30°26′27″E,Tu-95K stand-off missile carriers starting in 1959
Verkhnyaya Salda
58°02’44”N 60°33’12”E ICBM
Vidyayevo, aka Ura Bay, Northern Fleet Naval Base
69°19′N 32°48′E, diesel-powered subs 
Vorkuta Sovetsky (SB)
67°27′56″N 064°18′28″E, maintained by OGA (Arctic Control Group, one of the largest runways in Arctic region)
Vozdvizhenka, aka Ussuriysk
43°54′44″N 131°55′04″E, Pacific Long Range Bomber Fleet Tu-16
Welzow E. Ger
52°08'00"N 013°09'00"E
Werneuchen
52°37’54”N 013°46’09”E
Yoshkar-Ola
62°55’32”N 40°34’40”E
YurYa
​59°02’N 49°16’E ICBM
Zapadnaya Lista
​69°25’N 32°26’E, nuclear sub base 
Zaporozhye E.
47°52’N 035°19’E
Zavitinsk
50°11′30″N 129°30′12″E
Zelts E.
46°38’N 030°06’E
Zhitomir/Skomorokhi
50°10’N 028°44’E
Zyabrovka
​52°18′22.0″N 31°9′44.1″E, Tu-16R, Tu-16
Soviet Bases 156 Possible Targets
End Part III
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