Checkpoint Charlie and the |
(note that the Forrestal was in dry dock until February 1962, and the Enterprise joined the Atlantic Fleet in June 1962). |
This surprise attack takes place on September 1, 1962. At that time, McCone had warned the Kennedy administration that offensive weapons were being placed in Cuba but not yet operational. An investigation would have revealed this subterfuge and set the stage for the preventive attack that would be impossible seven weeks later when the Russians became apprised of the fact that the United States was aware of their lies and thus went on a high stage of alert.. The majority of the Golf and Hotel class SSBM submarines were in their pens for repairs while the Barents Sea was passable on September 1, 1962.
Care has to be taken that the carriers remain safe from the P-15 Termit, the K-10S, and the AS-1 anti-carrier missiles even though the reliability and accuracy are poor. Forces should not be grouped so as to alert the early warning stations in North Africa and northeast Europe.
The Enterprise and the Forrestal would be striking mainly Northern and Baltic fleet forces with A4D-2N (A-4C) Skyhawks Night/adverse weather version of A4D-2, with AN/APG-53A radar, autopilot, and a (LABS) low-altitude bombing system. The Wright J65-W-20 engine with 8,200 lbf (36 kN) of takeoff thrust was redesignated A-4C in 1962, 638 were built. It would carry the B-43, a lighweight (2,200 lbs) 1.4 Mt thermonuclear bomb.
Care has to be taken that the carriers remain safe from the P-15 Termit, the K-10S, and the AS-1 anti-carrier missiles even though the reliability and accuracy are poor. Forces should not be grouped so as to alert the early warning stations in North Africa and northeast Europe.
The Enterprise and the Forrestal would be striking mainly Northern and Baltic fleet forces with A4D-2N (A-4C) Skyhawks Night/adverse weather version of A4D-2, with AN/APG-53A radar, autopilot, and a (LABS) low-altitude bombing system. The Wright J65-W-20 engine with 8,200 lbf (36 kN) of takeoff thrust was redesignated A-4C in 1962, 638 were built. It would carry the B-43, a lighweight (2,200 lbs) 1.4 Mt thermonuclear bomb.
Specification of Douglas A4D-2N/A-4C Skyhawk
Engine: One Wright J65-W-16 turbojet, rated at 7,700 lbs.
Performance: maximum speed 657 mph at 4,000 feet; cruising speed 496 mph; stalling speed 140 mph.
Combat ceiling: 44,000 feet (clean), 40,000 feet with a single Mk.28 nuclear weapon.
Initial climb rate: 7,100 feet per minute. An altitude of 20,000 feet could be attained in 4.5 minutes with a single Mk 28. Combat range: 1,140 miles (clean).
Dimensions: wingspan 27 feet 6 inches.
Length: 40 feet 1 inch; height: 15 feet; wing area: 260 square feet;
Weights: 9,146 pounds empty, 15,359 pounds combat weight, 17,535 pounds gross, 22,500 pounds maximum; armament: two 20 mm cannons with 100 rpg; three underwing pylons; primarily coastal targets.
Performance: maximum speed 657 mph at 4,000 feet; cruising speed 496 mph; stalling speed 140 mph.
Combat ceiling: 44,000 feet (clean), 40,000 feet with a single Mk.28 nuclear weapon.
Initial climb rate: 7,100 feet per minute. An altitude of 20,000 feet could be attained in 4.5 minutes with a single Mk 28. Combat range: 1,140 miles (clean).
Dimensions: wingspan 27 feet 6 inches.
Length: 40 feet 1 inch; height: 15 feet; wing area: 260 square feet;
Weights: 9,146 pounds empty, 15,359 pounds combat weight, 17,535 pounds gross, 22,500 pounds maximum; armament: two 20 mm cannons with 100 rpg; three underwing pylons; primarily coastal targets.
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Coastal and Interior Targets for Carrier Planes
Enterprise and Forrestal :
- Vidyayevo, aka Ura Bay, Northern Fleet Naval Base 69°19′N 32°48′E, diesel-powered subs
- Polyarnyy 69°12’N 33°28’E
- Ura Bay Naval Base 69°19′N 32°48′E, and Ara Bay (#2)
- Severomorsk 69.0690°N, 33.4082°E, Northern Fleet home base
- Zapadnaya Lista aka Bolshaya Lopatka (Lista Guba) 69°25’N 32°26’E, nuclear sub base
- Malaya Lopatka-Bolshaya Lopatka 69°26'12"N 32°25'30"E, only 2 miles apart – main sub base
- Olenya (SB) near Skalisty less than 2 miles NE 68°09′06″N 033°28′12″E, Tu-22 first detected in 1957 and served as forward staging base; many SAM sites in this area, also Naval base
- Gadzhiyevo aka Yagelnaya Guba 69.258878° 33.335251°, located on the eastern shore of Guba Sayda (Sayda Bay), Murmanskaya Oblast Naval Base Northern Fleet
- Soltsy Air Base 58°8′48″N 030°19′54″E (#6)
- Ostrovnoy (Gremikha-Yokanga) 68°03′N 39°30′E, main service base for nuclear subs
- Severodvinsk 64°34′N 39°52′E
- Arkhangelsk 64°26’N 40°23’E (see also Lakhta I Naval base 64°23′0″N 40°43′0″E, Tu-16 base) (see also Arkhangelsk/Yagoon 64°24’N 40°54’E)
- Belmorsk 64°31’N 34°46’E, submarine base VIP
- Baltiysk Naval Base 54°39'16.38"N 19°54'33.44"E
- Karosta-Leipaja (submarines) 56°33′0″N 21°0′20″E, Baltic Fleets 14th Submarine Squadron
- Bykhov 53°31’N 30°12’E, one on 1956 target list, (East Germany) VIP
- Ozerne (MB) 50°9′30″N 028°44′18″E, 15th Guard’s Heavy Bomber Division Tu-16
- Baranovichi (MB) 53°5′7″N 26°2′8″E (Belarus), Tu-16 base deployed Tu-16 bombers to Tiski and onward to ice station SP-6
- Dyagilevo (MB) 54°38′30″N 039°34′18″E M-4 VIP
- Pochinok 54°20′24″N 032°28′24″E
- Seshcha 53°43’N 033°21’E
- Ostrov/Gorokhovo 57°18′0″N 028°26′0″E, Tu-16K and Tu-16Z
- Soltsy Air Base 58°8′48″N 030°19′54″E, Tu-22
- Bobruysk 53°6′17″N 29°12′21″E, threat to NATO allies
- Melitopol 46°52′36″N 035°18′27″E
- Tartu 58°24’N 026°46E
- Minsk-Machulische 53°46′25″N 027°34′38″E
- Pryluky Air Base 50°34′0″N 032°19′0″E, Tu-16 medium bombers
- Poltava Air Base 49°37′37″N 034°29′11″E, Tu-16
- Zhitomir/Skomorokhi 50°10’N 028°44’E
- Orsha/Orsha S.W. 54°26’N 30°17’E
- Gomel/Pribytki 52°18’N 031°10’E
- Leningrad Air Control Center 60°03’N 030°11’E
- Moscow/Bykovo Command and Control 55°37’N 38°03’E
Saratoga and Independence Targets:
The Saratoga (Aegean Sea) and the Independence (Adriatic) would utilize a similar component of planes to strike similar types of targets. In some cases, there would be a duplication of targets. They would also strike troops, airborne bases, and mechanized units within the reach of their carriers. Like any war plan it would change on the fly.
- Tyuratam-Baikonur 45°39’N 63°18’50”E ICBM four launch sites #2 VIP
- Belaya/Tserkov aka Bila Tserkva 49°47′46″N 30°01′28″E, heavy bomber base Tu-16 and later Tu-16N
- Uzyn Air Base 49°47′25″N 30°26′27″E, Tu-95K stand-off missile carriers starting in 1959 VIP
- Spassk-Dalny Airfield 44°36′47″N 132°53′13″E, Tu-16
- Mozdok 43°47′15″N 44°36′11″E, Tu-95 base VIP
- Melitopol 46°52′36″N 035°18′27″E
- Sevastopol 44°36′28″N 33°31′48″E Black Sea Fleet VIP
- Balaklava Crimea 44°29′56″N 33°35′46″E, submarine pen deeply fortified needs Mt or more (hidden subs in cave) VIP
- Pryluky Air Base 50°34′0″N 032°19′0″E, Tu-16 medium bombers
- Poltava Air Base 49°37′37″N 034°29′11″E, Tu-16
- Zhitomir/Skomorokhi 50°10’N 028°44’E
- Poltava Air Base 49°37′37″N 034°29′11″E, Tu-16
The B-47s would be devoted to MRBM sites from the Baltic to the ukraine. Fifty to one hundred of those sites have been identified. Note that Wunsdorf has to be hit with conventional weapons because of its proximity to Berlin. Below are a few examples:
- Plokstine 56°1′39″N 21°54′33″E
- Rohu 59°8'48''N 26°26'24''E
- Klaipeda 55°42′45″N 21°08′06″E
- Wunsdorf N 52°11’52” 13°28’'00” E ( not an MRBM site but home base for over 50,000 Soviet Troops)
At sites located close to NATO bases, a surface burst of a smaller nuclear weapon would be used. It should also be noted that the attack could be carried out with only two aircraft carriers, each with 40 A-4Cs and 15 A-5As because of the lack of strategic targets as noted in the opinion section below.
Ballistic Missile Submarines:
- George Washington 16 A-1, 1,400 miles, 1 Mt warhead
- Patrick Henry 16 A-1, 1,400 miles, 1 Mt warhead
- Theodore Roosevelt 16 A-1, 1,400 miles, 1 Mt Warhead
- Robert E. Lee 16 A-1, 1,400 miles, 1 Mt warhead
- Abraham Lincoln 16 A-1, 1,400 miles, 1 Mt warhead
Located in the Barents Sea, giving all five enough range to reach Moscow and /or Leningrad.
Ethan Allen Class:
All three have the A-2 missile with a 1,725-mile range and a 1 Mt warhead, located in the Adriatic or Aegean Sea, giving them enough range to reach Moscow, Leningrad, or other opportunistic targets.
All ICBms and the remaining 725 B-52s would be held back as negotiations for surrender would have taken place after the second wave which would inclue all non-B-52 assets above.
- Ethan Allen SSBN-608
- Sam Houston SSBN-609
- Thomas A. Edison SSBN-610
All ICBms and the remaining 725 B-52s would be held back as negotiations for surrender would have taken place after the second wave which would inclue all non-B-52 assets above.
Conclusion
Carl Kaysen was interviewed by Marc Trachtenberg, David Rosenberg, and Stephen Van Evera in 1988. During that interview, Kaysen disclosed that he and Rowen were aghast at the carnage inherent in SIOP-62 and concluded, after presenting their plan to Robert McNamara, that “we knew that there were only 6 or 7 operational ones (missiles) and 3 or 4 more in the test sites and so on. As for the Soviet bombers, they were in a very low state of alert. . . . And the answer was that in 1961 we could have made sure, with a high level of confidence to disarm the Soviets in this way, there was no need to execute the whole SAC mission.”
In the end, Kennedy and McNamara decided against the plan because “there were just too many things that could go wrong.” But had Live Oak failed to open the autobahn, my guess is that there would have been renewed consideration of this plan in light of the US rejection of TNWs as an alternative in 1957.
In the end, Kennedy and McNamara decided against the plan because “there were just too many things that could go wrong.” But had Live Oak failed to open the autobahn, my guess is that there would have been renewed consideration of this plan in light of the US rejection of TNWs as an alternative in 1957.
Opinion
Both plans in their totality constitute massive overkill. Ten B-52H bombers alone could have taken out the less than twenty strategic targets in 1961-1962. The 10-28-61 DPM may have recognized that and provided all the other assets to take out Moscow and Leningrad if the Soviets fired on London or Paris. Taking out the command-and-control systems begs the question as to how the Soviets contact all of the MRBM sites and tell them the war is over. Kennedy and McNamara knew that "in the fog of war" any plan would face many other unforseen problems as well and thankfully Khrushchev knew that he could not push the young American President to the precipice.
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